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ABSTRACT

An Empirical Investigation of the
Adaptive Nature of Shame

by

Elizabeth J. Dansie, Master of Science
Utah State University, 2008

Major Professor: Dr. Tamara Ferguson
Department: Psychology

Throughout the empirical psychological literature on emotion, the general
consensus is that shame is maladaptive, while guilt is the adaptive moral emotion.
Conversely, evolutionary psychology concludes that all emotions serve adaptive
functions. Specifically, shame serves an appeasement function in social relationships. In
order to investigate the true nature of shame, the current study used an experimental
design. Specifically, a 2 (high shame, no shame) X 2 (high guilt, no guilt) design with a
no-mistakes control group was implemented, and shame and guilt were operationalized
through an evolutionary lens (i.e., shame as a nonverbal display, guilt as verbalizations of
apology). Participants (n = 110) and were told they would be assisting psychology
faculty members with interviewing candidates for a research position. During the
interview, the candidate made three mistakes, and showed shame and/or guilt according
to the 2 X 2 design. Participants then rated how well the candidate performed. Results
were analyzed using a 2-way ANOVA and independent samples t tests, and it was found
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that participants rated the candidate more favorably in both shame conditions.
Importantly, there were no significant differences between those participants who viewed
the candidate who made no mistakes (control condition) and those that viewed the
candidate showing shame after multiple mistakes. Thus, apparently saying “sorry” is not
quite enough.
(166 pages)
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CHAPTER I
PROBLEM STATEMENT

In the past few decades, there has been a surge of new research dedicated to the
topic of human emotion. Experts in the area of human motivation consider emotions to
be primary motivational systems throughout the lifespan (Izard, 1977; Tomkins, 1962,
1963). Emotions serve various functions (Barrett, 1995) and their experience helps
individuals react appropriately to recurring challenges in environment (Ekman, 1992;
Keltner & Gross, 1999).
In addition to an increased interest in emotions generally, recent research in
psychology and other social sciences (e.g., Fessler, 2003; Scheff, 1988) has focused
intensely on the emotions shame and guilt. Interest in these two states stems from their
association with both negative and positive facets of human functioning (Tangney &
Dearing, 2002). Knowledge regarding these two emotions has been hampered,
unfortunately, by disagreements in the literature concerning their definitions and
functions. When examining definitions of shame and guilt in the Oxford English
Dictionary (Simpson & Weiner, 1989), it is clear that the various definitions of shame
have in common a core theme of possible devaluation by others or by the self because of
disgrace caused by attributes of the self or one’s conduct. Similarly, common elements
in the various definitions of guilt concern disgrace because of knowing that one has
committed an offense or being responsible for a negative event.
While scientists generally concur that both shame and guilt are self-conscious and
social emotions (Barrett, 1995; Lewis, 1991), they disagree regarding whether the two
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states differ in their public versus private focus (Gehm & Scherer, 1988) or in their focus
on the “flawed self” versus an “untoward act” (Lewis, 1971). Controversy still abounds
regarding each emotion’s status as a moral versus nonmoral state (Ausubel, 1955;
Ferguson, Brugman, White, & Eyre, 2007), the distinct functions that each fulfills
(Barrett; Campos, Frankel, & Camras, 2004), and the precise appraisals or attributions
needed to arouse each state (Tracy & Robins, 2004; Weiner, 1985).
In the midst of these controversies, two conclusions currently dominate the
empirical literature regarding individuals’ tendencies to respond to their mishaps with
guilt or shame. Shame proneness has been linked to diverse negative affective states
(e.g., anger, phobias, and anxiety) and symptoms of problems (e.g., drug or alcohol
abuse), while the opposite has been found regarding tendencies to respond with guilt
(Tangney & Dearing, 2002). Tangney and Dearing have adamantly proclaimed guilt to
be an adaptive self-conscious emotion, with shame being a dark, ugly, and decidedly
maladaptive emotion. Virtually all of these studies are correlational in design and almost
all of them have used the Test of Self-Conscious Affect (TOSCA; Tangney, Wagner, &
Gramzow, 1989), or its variants (see Ferguson et al., 2007) to assess guilt and shame
proneness. The TOSCA paradigm presumes the validity of H. B. Lewis’ distinction
between shame as a focus on the self and guilt as a focus on one’s actions.
Many researchers have criticized conclusions regarding shame’s maladaptive
status and guilt’s adaptive qualities on both methodological and conceptual grounds. The
measure most often used to assess shame and guilt, the TOSCA, essentially
operationalizes shame as maladaptive but guilt as an adaptive response to one’s misdeeds
(Elison, 2002, 2003a; Ferguson, et al., 2007; Ferguson & Stegge, 1998; Luyten, Fontaine,
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& Corveleyn, 2002). Importantly, too, the TOSCA presumes that shame and guilt are
distinct, discrete emotions that are meaningfully contrasted (Elison, 2001, 2002;
Ferguson & Crowley, 1997; Ferguson & Stegge; Sabini & Silver, 1997). Moreover,
Tangney and Dearing (2002) routinely rely on semipartial correlational analyses to create
“shame-free guilt” and “guilt-free shame,” and it is these constructs that are used to
examine each emotion’s adaptive value. Many researchers have also criticized the
validity of this approach on various methodological and conceptual grounds (Elison,
2003a, 2003b; Ferguson & Crowley, 1993, 1994, 1997; Ferguson & Stegge).
Conversely, many authors have analyzed shame or guilt from an evolutionary
perspective. More specifically, these researchers view that these emotions are evolved,
behavioral adaptations that assist individuals with successfully navigating their social and
physical environments (e.g., Izard, 1977; Tomkins, 1963). An important difference
between this view and the view of others, such as Tangney (Tangney & Dearing, 2002)
and Baumeister (Baumeister, Stillwell, & Heatherton, 1994), is the scope of the social
environment. Whereas Tangney and Baumeister focus on interpersonal relationships in
terms of local, dyadic relationships (e.g., romantic or parent-child interactions), an
evolutionary view is much broader in scope, encompassing everything from romantic
relationships to interactions with strangers. Functioning within this broader social
domain, some recent researchers view shame as a “damage limitation strategy” (Gilbert
& McGuire, 1998), others through the paradigm of the “social self-preservation theory”
(Gruenwald, Dickerson, & Kemeny, 2007), and finally, some propose that shame
functions as an appeasement mechanism to reestablish social harmony after a violation or
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transgression (Keltner & Harker, 1998; Lazowski, 1988; Masters, 1988; Savitsky & Sim,
1974; Semin & Manstead, 1982; Tsoudis & Smith-Lovin, 1998). Common in all these
explanations of shame and guilt is the assertion that shame, indeed, serves adaptive
functions, which directly contradicts proponents of Tangney and colleague’s model, and
renders conclusions drawn regarding shame based on research using the TOSCA
questionable.
But how does shame serve these functions? From this evolutionary perspective,
certain researchers assert that the appeasement function shame serves is through its
unique facial (i.e., lowering of the eyelids, a lowered tonus of facial muscles; Tomkins,
1963) and nonverbal display (i.e., lowering of the head, gaze aversion, and postural
shrinkage; Darwin, 1872; Gilbert & McGuire, 1998; Izard, 1977; Keltner, 1995;
Tomkins, 1963, 1987). These submissive displays then function as an “appeasement”
mechanism, which was “designed to [help individuals] de-escalate and/or escape from
conflicts” (Gilbert & McGuire, p. 102) and even elicit sympathy in others (Keltner &
Harker, 1998; Tsoudis & Smith-Lovin, 1998). Moreover, expressions of shame in
humans often are found in nonhuman primates and are known to serve the same functions
(de Waal, 1988; Gruenwald et al., 2007; Keltner & Harker). Moderate support has also
been found for a unique vocalic pattern for shame (Pfaff, 1954; Van Bezooijen, Otto, &
Heenan, 1983), but no evidence exists for or against a distinctive autonomic nervous
system response for shame (Scherer & Wallbott, 1994).
In contrast to the reliably identifiable bodily expression of shame, researchers
have yet to establish any unique facial or other nonverbal displays (Ekman, 1992; Keltner
& Buswell, 1996; Tomkins, 1987), vocalic pattern (Pfaff, 1954; Van Bezooijen, et al.,
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1983), or autonomic nervous system (ANS) pattern for guilt (Scherer & Wallbott, 1994).
Instead, guilt is considered an evolutionary overlay that evolved after shame and is
expressed solely through language (e.g., apologies) or symbolic behaviors (e.g., offers of
repair), appearing only in humans. Thus, from this point of view, shame is a necessary
accompaniment of untoward behavior for humans wishing to avoid rejection, expulsion,
or retaliation following a transgression. Guilt might add to lessened negative reactions,
because it clarifies appraisals of the wrongdoing’s specific nature, but it is neither
necessary nor sufficient to minimize outsiders’ negative reactions. In fact, Ferguson and
colleagues (2007) demonstrated that guilt-related behaviors actually are less likely to be
seen as genuine remorse or contrition unless they are accompanied by shame. Although
evidence is lacking for a unique guilt expression, other researchers do argue for an
evolutionary basis for guilt, stating that guilt functions as a sign to conspecifics
acknowledging a wrongdoing and the intention to not repeat the transgression, while also
minimizing attack from others in the social group (Barrett, 1995).
Various studies have been conducted demonstrating that shame does, indeed,
serve as an appeasement mechanism after a transgression (Edelmann, 1982; Keltner,
Young, & Buswell, 1997; Keltner, Young, Heerey, Oemig, & Monarch, 1998; Lazowski,
1988; Savitsky & Sim, 1974; Semin & Manstead; 1982; Semin & Papadopoulou, 1990;
Tsoudis & Smith-Lovin, 1998; Young, Keltner, & Lingswieler, 1996), but various
methodological issues and limitations are noted when examining these investigations.
The most notable limitation is that previous studies conducted on shame’s appeasement
function lack ecological validity. Specifically, previous investigations capture neither
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shame’s dynamic display nor live, meaningful interpersonal interactions or exchanges.
The position taken in this paper is that shame and guilt are social emotions that function
in an interpersonal context, which evolved to warn individuals that we may not be
creating positive impressions in “the minds of the other” (Barrett, 1995; Cooley, 1964;
Gilbert, 2007; Scheff, 1988). Shame functions to restore personal relationships, thus it is
essential to measure the appeasement functions shame serves using a realistic,
behaviorally-based study that explores shame functioning to reduce damage in an actual
interpersonal context. Importantly, however, no studies have examined the extent to
which behavioral or “life-like” guilt and shame reactions produce distinctive impressions
of transgressors. It seems imperative, therefore, to conduct a behaviorally based study
comparing the adaptive value of shame and guilt using an operationalization of shame
that better aligns with the known nonverbal (facial and nonfacial) signals of shame-asappeasement (as opposed to defining shame a priori as maladaptive).
There are many disagreements in the literature regarding guilt and shame. Of
primary interest in this thesis is contrasting the conclusion that shame is maladaptive
(i.e., when measured by the TOSCA) to the conclusion that shame is adaptive (i.e., when
shame is operationalized through an evolutionary perspective as the nonverbal display of
shame). Specifically, it is hypothesized that a transgressor’s nonverbal display of shame
will mitigate negative evaluations made by the transgressed (e.g., providing evidence for
appeasement). A secondary hypothesis is that a transgressor’s expressions of shame,
when compared to just a communication of guilt, will have a greater positive effect on
other people’s reactions to the transgressor. If evolutionary based treatments of shame
are valid, expressions of shame, more so than admissions of guilt, should enhance
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positive perceptions of the transgressor. The mechanism responsible for the positive
impact of shame, according to evolutionary analysts of the two states, is that shame but
not guilt communicates that the transgressor feels bad, values the relationship, and is less
likely to repeat the transgression, thus minimizing rejection or counterattack. Two
additional hypotheses follow the two main purposes: (a) expressions of guilt
accompanying an ashamed reaction should not enhance others’ positive reactions, and (b)
guilt will only mitigate negative impressions beyond a response consisting of neither
shame nor guilt. Should these hypotheses receive support, it would cast doubt on several
aspects of the research using the TOSCA to measure shame and guilt.
Moreover, as will be discussed, shame and guilt are not only elicited after a moral
violation or transgression, but instead are also frequently elicited in
achievement/competition situations. Thus, in the current study, shame and guilt will be
investigated in the context of a job interview. Specifically, an interpersonal achievement
paradigm adapted from Pedersen, Bushman, Vasquez, and Miller (2006) will be used.
Their paradigm was chosen because Pedersen and colleagues found that the job
candidate’s inept behavior increased participants’ feelings of frustration and anger, as
well as tendencies to denigrate the job applicant. The paradigm, therefore, engages the
very types of reactions (i.e., rejection and devaluation) in response to which the shame
expression should signal submission and lead to appeasement (i.e., mitigate negative
evaluations of the candidate). In this study, a live experimental design will be used
where participants will be involved in an actual interpersonal interaction with a job
candidate who will express shame and/or guilt in reaction to her mistakes. Specifically, a
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2 shame condition (High Shame, No Shame) by 2 guilt condition (High Guilt, No Guilt)
full factorial design, with an additional no-mistakes control condition will be used to
address the aforementioned hypotheses. Thus, evaluations of the candidate will be the
dependent measure.
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CHAPTER II
LITERATURE REVIEW

Though terror speaks to life and death and distress makes of the world a
veil of tears, yet shame strikes deepest into the heart of man. While terror
and distress hurt, they are wounds inflicted from the outside which
penetrate the smooth surface of the ego; but shame is felt as an inner
torment, a sickness of the soul. It does not matter whether the humiliated
one has been shamed by derisive laughter, or whether he mocks himself.
In either event he feels himself naked, defeated, alienated, lacking in
dignity and worth. (Tomkins, 1963, p. 118)
In this chapter, the emotions shame and guilt will be explored. The history of the
English terms shame and guilt, and their origins will be discussed, along with different
theoretical conceptualizations of these emotions. Next, how these emotions have been
operationalized and measured in psychological research and their common correlates will
be investigated. Criticisms of the assessment instrument predominately used to measure
shame and guilt will be examined. An evolutionary based argument for the origins of
shame and guilt will then be discussed, highlighting the adaptive functions each emotion
serves. How these two emotions are communicated will be explored, along with
previous methods used to investigate the functions that shame and guilt serve. Finally, a
crosscultural view of shame and guilt will be discussed. This review will set the stage for
the current study, which hypothesizes that the prevailing view of shame as maladaptive
and guilt as adaptive is due to biases in the measurement and types of statistical analyses
used to investigate these two emotional states. Thus, the present study proposes that an
experimental approach to measuring shame and guilt, based on an evolutionary
understanding of their functions, may more accurately elucidate their characteristics.
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Definitional History of Shame and Guilt

Emotions play a critical role in human functioning and have been considered by
some as the primary motivational system in humans, involved in organizing cognition,
perception, and action (Izard, 1977; Tomkins, 1962, 1963). Similarly, emotions are
considered to serve specific functions, including behavioral regulatory, social regulatory,
and internal regulatory functions (Barrett, 1995). Specifically, the emotions shame and
guilt have been the subject of much research because of their association with various
outcome and process indices, including certain forms of psychopathology, empathy, the
welfare of relationships, and self-esteem (see Tangney & Dearing, 2002 for a review).
The scientific study of these two emotions has become increasingly popular but has been
hampered by disagreements regarding their definitions and functions. Many distinctions
have been proposed between shame and guilt. In the following section, the proposed
commonalities and distinctions between shame and guilt will be discussed.
The terms shame and guilt have a long history in the English language, with the
root words for shame dating back to 725 A.D., while guilt appeared sometime later,
around 971 A.D. (Oxford English Dictionary; Simpson & Weiner, 1989). While both of
these terms have Teutonic roots, only shame has been assumed to have pre-Teutonic
roots, with aidos being the term representing shame in the Greek language (Williams,
1993). In the English language, Teutonic roots of shame include skam, scant, or skanda,
indicating disgrace or ashamed. Many definitions are given for shame in the Oxford
English Dictionary (OED), with the first entry being,
The painful emotion arising from the consciousness of something
dishonouring, ridiculous, or indecorous in one’s own conduct or
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circumstances (or in those of others whose honour or disgrace one regards
as one’s own), or of being in a situation which offends one’s sense of
modesty or decency. (Simpson & Weiner, pp. 162-164)
Other definitions are similar, including, “the right perception of what is improper or
disgraceful,” “ignominy, loss of esteem or reputation,” and “fear of offence against
propriety or decency, operating as a restraint on behaviour.” What all of these definitions
have in common is possible devaluation by others because of one’s own conduct or
apsects of one’s self that are considered to cause disgrace.
When considering guilt in the English language, the Teutonic roots include geld,
gald, guld, or gylt (OED; Simpson & Weiner, 1989, pp. 935-936). These terms infer a
sense of debt, where the individual is assumed to feel a sense of “guilt” from this debt.
Seven defintions for guilt are provided in the OED, beginning with, “a failure of duty,
delinquency; offence, crime, sin” (Simpson & Weiner). Many of these defintions include
the theme of “responsibility for an action or event” or knowing that one has committed
an offense. Interestingly, only in the last definition are “guilty feelings” addressed, with
the defintion being “a mental obsession with the idea of having done wrong.”
Importantly, these definitions of guilt are linked to those of shame. One use of the term
shame is a “sense of shame,” and is defined as a “guilty feeling.” Upon further analysis,
it is clear that many of the definitions of shame indicate that one source of shame is an
act committed or a sense of guilt that triggers the emotion shame. For example, in the
first definition of shame, one’s own conduct results in the painful emotion of shame.
Moreover, while Pre-Teutonic roots of the word shame have been found, with the term
aidos being used in ancient Greek culture, there was no distinct Greek term for guilt
(Williams, 1993). Instead of differentiating shame and guilt, aidos was used to include
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both terms. Terms used to distinguish shame and guilt arose much later, and Williams
notes it was only with the rise of Christianity that guilt was used to identify a specific
subset of situations that were once encompassed by the term shame.

Conceptualizations of Shame and Guilt

Along with various definitions of shame and guilt, many theoretical
conceptualizations of the terms have been proposed. In studying shame and guilt, Lewis
(1991) classifies both emotions similarly as self-conscious emotions. In his framework,
to experience shame and guilt, individuals must acquire four cognitive capabilities.
These acquisitions include the following: the development of self-consciousness; a
knowledge of the rules, standards, and goals guiding behavior; an ability to evaluate
oneself based upon those rules, standards, and goals; and self-focus. For Lewis, selfconsciousness is defined as a type of metacognition where an individual has knowledge
of one’s knowledge of the self, while self-focus is where an individual is focused on the
entire self rather than on one aspect of the self. Other researchers have categorized
shame and guilt both as social emotions, because they are elicited primarily in social
interactions and serve primarily social functions (Barrett, 1995). Barrett contends that
humans live in social groups with standards to facilitate human interaction, and negative
social emotions help individuals realize these goals by serving as a warning signal when
a standard has been violated. To elaborate, an individual would feel shame or guilt after
violating a certain social norm, and the experience of shame and guilt functions to alert
the individual of their wrongdoing and motivate them to avoid the same wrongdoing in
the future.

13
Although shame and guilt are similar in that they are both considered selfconscious or social emotions, many theorists and researchers have further attempted to
distinguish between the two emotions. Early researchers writing on shame and guilt
attempted to make a distinction based on the kinds of situations that elicit shame or guilt
(Benedict, 1946). One popular but possibly misguided idea was the “public/private”
distinction, where shame was defined as dependent on public exposure of one’s weakness
or failure, whereas guilt’s experience could be expected when the wrongdoing was a
secret known only to the transgressor (Gehm & Scherer, 1988). A second distinction is
the “nonmoral/moral” distinction. In this view, shame occurs after violating non-moral
standards (e.g., test failure), whereas guilt arises after a moral standard violation
(Ausubel, 1955; Erikson, 1959/1994). Importantly, these two distinctions have received
little empirical support. Both shame and guilt have been found to be elicited more
frequently in a public (e.g., with a group of individuals), rather than in a private context
(e.g., when an individual is alone), and both emotions can be elicited after a nonmoral or
moral transgression (Tangney & Dearing, 2002). A third, and more cognitively based,
distinction between shame and guilt is based on a class of theories known as appraisal
theory. In Lazarus’s (1991) model, he distinguished between shame and guilt using a
flow-chart of cognitions that lead to each emotion. Guilt is elicited when a moral
transgression has occurred, whereas shame is elicited when the individual fails to live up
to an ego-ideal. Clearly, this distinction between shame and guilt overlaps with the
nonmoral/moral distinction. A fourth, related, cognitive approach referred to as
attribution theory claims that shame arises when an undesired outcome is perceived to
reflect internal, stable, and uncontrollable causes (e.g., test failure due to low ability),
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whereas guilt is experienced when the same outcome can be explained in terms of
internal, unstable, controllable characteristics, such as low effort leading to test failure
(Tracy & Robins, 2004; Weiner, 1985).
Different from the more cognitively oriented approaches, a fifth approach
differentiates the two emotions from a functionalist perspective (Barrett, 1995), in which
the functions that shame and guilt serve are used to distinguish between the two
emotions. From this perspective, shame motivates a withdrawal or avoidance response to
essentially hide the self, communicates submission, and highlights important standards
from which the individual has deviated. On the other hand, guilt motivates approach
tendencies, in which the guilty person is inclined to apologize, communicates an
awareness of proper behavior, and highlights important standards (Barrett, 1995; Frijda,
1986). A sixth perspective considers shame as an innate, basic emotion, whereas guilt is
not considered an emotion at all. Instead, guilt is considered a sociolegal condition of
being responsible for a transgression (Ortony, 1987), with the recognition that this
condition may be associated with a variety of emotions (e.g., sadness, shame).
Finally, Lewis’s (1971) conceptualization of shame and guilt represents a seventh
distinction between the two states. In her view,
The experience of shame is directly about the self, which is the focus of
evaluation. In guilt, the self is not the central object of negative
evaluation, but rather the thing done or undone is the focus. In guilt, the
self is negatively evaluated in connection with something but is not itself
the focus of the experience. (p. 30; emphasis in original)
Shame is considered a focus on the entire self by the self, or a real or imagined other,
(Lewis’s phrases, “How could I do that?”), while guilt focuses on the behavior or act of
the person (“How could I do that?”). Because of this distinction, the phenomenological
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experience of the two emotions is quite different. Lewis described the experience of
shame as very painful, involving a sense of worthlessness, and an urge to escape or
disappear. In contrast, guilt is a less painful experience, because the focus is instead
placed upon the act, and people feel anxiety, tension, or an urge to repair the wrong done.
This distinction is the most well known of many distinctions Lewis attested to when
discussing shame and guilt, but importantly, Lewis saw the two states as resulting at least
from different aspects or appraisals of the “same” event (and its after-effects). She did
not view shame to be a greater emotional source of psychological problems than guilt.
Instead, she viewed both emotions as a source of personal growth, with
adaptive/maladaptive outcomes depending on a variety of other factors (e.g., repressive
versus sensitizing styles of defense). Finally, Lewis stated that the two states occur in a
cyclical fashion with each individual experiencing both emotions in rapid succession.
Clearly, although these many definitions and conceptualizations exist in the
theoretical literature regarding shame and guilt, shame and guilt are similar emotional
states. Taken together, the definitions in the OED (Simpson & Weiner, 1989) provide
support that both guilt and shame arise when an individual experiences disgrace because
of one’s conduct or negative characteristics, and that separate distinctions for the term
guilt did not come about until relatively recently in time. Furthermore, as Barrett (1995)
contends, as a highly social species, humans rely on others, and shame and guilt help us
navigate the social environment on which we are dependent. Likewise, as Lewis (1971)
states, the two often co-occur, and are elicited from the same types of events. Finally,
because these emotions operate in a social context, both shame and guilt are highly
linked to creating positive impressions in “the minds of the other” (Barrett, 1995; Cooley,
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1964; Gilbert, 2007; Scheff, 1988). These emotions “evolved not to respond to people’s
private evaluations of themselves but rather to regulate their interactions and
relationships with other people” (Leary, 2007, p. 46).

Measuring Shame and Guilt: Introduction

Though many scholars proclaim that shame and guilt can operate in concert to
promote avoidance of future misdeeds, much of the extant empirical literature, including
the measurement literature, does not echo this viewpoint. This literature makes use of
various instruments meant to be valid assessments of guilt and/or shame (Tangney,
1996). All of these instruments have been roundly criticized by Tangney and since the
date of her influential publication they have rarely been employed in published studies of
the two states. Instead, the Self-Conscious Affect and Attribution Inventory (SCAAI;
Tangney, 1990), and versions of its successor, the Test of Self-Conscious Affect
(TOSCA; Tangney et al., 1989), dominate empirical investigations of guilt and shame.
Both the SCAAI and versions of the TOSCA are similar in format, with each using
scenarios to depict various misdeeds or mishaps in response to which individuals judge
their emotional reactions. Tangney and colleagues, however, soon replaced the SCAAI
with the TOSCA, primarily because the SCAAI scenarios were not drawn from actual or
real-life incidents, whereas those in the TOSCAs were, and thereby supposedly
represented events with which people could more readily identify. Many versions of the
TOSCA paradigm have been developed for different groups of individuals, including the
TOSCA for Children (Tangney, Wagner, Burggraf, Gramzow, & Fletcher, 1990), the
TOSCA-2 (Tangney, Ferguson, Wagner, Crowley, & Gramzow, 1996), TOSCA for
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Adolescents (Tangney, Wagner, Gavlas, & Gramzow, 1991), and the TOSCA for
Socially Deviant individuals (Hanson & Tangney, 1995). The TOSCA-based paradigm
has become so popular that Ferguson and her associates dubbed it the “gold standard” for
measuring guilt and shame (Ferguson & Eyre, 1998; Nelsen & Crowell-Peterson, 2004).

Measuring Guilt and Shame: The TOSCA Paradigm

The TOSCA (Tangney et al., 1989) is a scenario-based measure where 15
common situations or experiences are given to respondents, followed by descriptions of
shame, guilt, and other emotional (e.g., alpha and beta pride) or defensive (e.g.,
externalization and detachment) responses to the situations, without explicitly using the
emotion labels shame, pride, and guilt. Respondents are asked to indicate how likely
they would endorse the shame and guilt descriptors as reactions to each scenario on a 5point likelihood scale. The descriptors of shame and guilt presented in the TOSCA
paradigm were based on Lewis’s (1971) analysis of the two states. Using Lewis’
conceptualization as a guide, shame is described in the TOSCA as self-directed anger,
withdrawal, or avoidance responses, while guilt in this measure is represented as
intentions to apologize, repair the mistake made, feelings of regret, and statements
regarding a need to be punished. An example of a TOSCA scenario is, “While out with a
group of friends, you make fun of a friend who’s not there.” After reading the scenario,
the respondent is asked to endorse how likely they would be to react with shame and guilt
in that situation. The responses to this situation are, for shame, “You would feel
small…like a rat,” and for guilt, “You would apologize and talk about that person’s good
points.” Each participant’s ratings of the shame and guilt descriptors are then summed
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across the 15 situations to form scores for each individuals’ proneness to shame and guilt,
thus measuring both emotions as a trait (Tangney, Dearing, Wagner, & Gramzow, 2000).
Asking participants to rate descriptors of emotional responses, rather than to
endorse brief labels depicting the emotions (e.g., shame, guilt), is one of the TOSCA’s
strongest virtues, because adults supposedly confuse the labels guilt with shame
(Tangney, 1996; Tangney & Dearing, 2002). As will be discussed below, however, these
descriptors have generated considerable controversy regarding their validity. In point of
fact, authors of the TOSCA introduced this paradigm to the field without presenting
much solid evidence regarding the instrument’s psychometric properties. Although
speculative, it seems that the TOSCA authors assumed it would be psychometrically
sound, because it was modeled after the SCAAI. Earlier, Tangney (1990) had shown the
SCAAI to possess respectable homogeneity estimates (Cronbach’s alpha ranging from
.46 to .82 for the various subscales) and adequate test-retest reliability coefficients
(ranging from .71 to .79). Evidence attesting to various facets of the TOSCA paradigm’s
validity and its reliability is interwoven within the following series of sections, each of
which highlights results deriving from the TOSCA.

Correlational Investigations of Shame and Guilt

Since its development, the TOSCA (Tangney et al., 1989) has become the most
widely used instrument for the measurement of shame and guilt proneness (Robins,
Noftle, & Tracy, 2007) and for assessing each emotion’s role in well-being and symptom
formation in individuals. To examine each emotion score’s predictive value, researchers
typically first residualize from each emotion its shared variance with the other emotion
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score, thereby creating shame-free guilt and guilt-free shame indices. It usually is these
residual emotion scores that are differentially correlated with diverse outcome variables
(Tangney & Dearing, 2002). For example, guilt-free shame has been found to be
positively correlated with many maladaptive traits (e.g., hostility-anger, personal distress,
depression, somatization, obsessive-compulsive disorder, narcissism, psychoticism,
paranoid ideation, interpersonal sensitivity, and anxiety), but is negatively correlated with
empathy, self-esteem, and perspective taking (Tangney & Dearing, 2002; see Appendix
A). The opposite has been found for shame-free guilt (see Tangney & Dearing, for a
review). Although zero-order correlation coefficients of each emotion score to each
outcome score are sometimes also reported, the interpretation of results is generally
based on the semipartial (also known as “part”) correlation coefficients.
These diverse findings strongly cast shame in a negative light: at least as
measured using residual scores from the TOSCA, shame appears to be very maladaptive.
In contrast to TOSCA-based shame, its guilt counterpart has been found to be positively
correlated with many adaptive traits, but primarily when the shame-free guilt scores are
examined. Although advocates of the TOSCA methodology recognize that
unresidualized guilt scores correlate with outcome variable scores in ways similar to
shame or guilt-free shame, Tangney and Dearing (2002) conclude that “shame is an
extremely painful and ugly feeling that has a negative impact on interpersonal behavior”
(p. 3). In contrast, they conclude that guilt actually enhances interpersonal behavior by
guiding individuals to behave in a more constructive, responsible manner (see also
Baumeister et al., 1994). In fact, when researchers have demonstrated that guilt may be
positively correlated with maladaptive outcomes, Tangney and Dearing argue that “guilt
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is especially likely to ‘take a turn for the worse’ when it becomes fused with shame” (p.
45), and “it is the shame component of this sequence, not the guilt component, that poses
a torturous dilemma” (p. 122). This is not only Tangney and associates’, but most other
researchers’ rationale for residualizing shame from guilt.
Although Tangney and other researchers using the TOSCA condemn shame as
maladaptive and praise guilt as being the adaptive moral emotion (Tangney & Dearing,
2002), the position taken in the current study is that both emotions assist individuals with
effectively functioning in their social environments. In the following section, multiple
criticisms of the TOSCA will be presented to lend support for the position that the
conclusions regarding guilt and shame are resultant from methodological flaws in the
TOSCA.

The Measurement of Shame and Guilt
Using the TOSCA

Although the TOSCA (Tangney et al., 1989) is the most frequently used
instrument for assessing shame and guilt, many researchers have objected to the use of
this instrument based on both theoretical and methodological grounds. First, one
immediately apparent problem is that the TOSCA does not capture the cyclical or
temporally proximate aspects that seem inherent to experiences of shame and guilt, at
least according to Lewis (1971). The TOSCA further operationalizes shame and guilt as
very distinct, discrete emotions with very different phenomenological experiences and
action tendencies. The TOSCA descriptors render shame and guilt as opposing
emotional experiences; shame is operationalized as a tendency to “avoid,” whereas guilt
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is a tendency to “approach” (Elison, 2001, 2002; Ferguson & Crowley, 1997; Ferguson &
Stegge, 1998; Sabini & Silver, 1997). Second, the TOSCA has been further criticized
because its items actually represent shame as maladaptive feelings, while guilt is seen as
adaptive behaviors (Elison, 2002, 2003a; Ferguson et al., 2007; Ferguson & Stegge;
Luyten et al., 2002). Third, along with these definitional and operational issues, Tangney
and other researchers using the TOSCA have been criticized for frequently interpreting
its results after using a statistical partialing procedure (see Tangney & Dearing, 2002, for
example) to examine the two emotions as nonoverlapping constructs (Elison, 2003a,
2003b; Ferguson & Stegge). Each of these criticisms will be elaborated below to provide
evidence that the conclusions regarding shame being maladaptive and guilt being
adaptive are misguided and may solely stem from the method used to measure these
emotions.

TOSCA: Definitional Criticisms
Several researchers have criticized the TOSCA because it was developed based
upon definitions of shame and guilt that characterize the two emotions as distinctly
different constructs, and thus may actually over-discriminate between the two emotions
(Elison, 2001, 2002; Ferguson & Crowley, 1997; Ferguson & Stegge, 1998; Sabini &
Silver, 1997). As previously described, the TOSCA was created according to Lewis’s
(1971) self/act distinction, but the TOSCA fails to capture the cyclical nature of these
two emotions. Instead the TOSCA, as well as the common interpretation of TOSCA
scores, treats these two emotions as nonoverlapping and “either-or” experiences. This
overdiscrimination has been criticized because the complementary occurrence of shame
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and guilt is theoretically important; shame helps individuals to avoid committing
violations, while guilt assists individuals with repairing violations that have been
committed (Ferguson et al., 2007). Likewise, in an empirical investigation into the
discrimination of shame from guilt using a factor analytic approach of 18 shame and guilt
measures, Kugler and Jones (1992) concluded that there is little evidence supporting a
distinction between the two constructs, and thus for distinguishing between shame and
guilt. In a multimethod multitrait confirmatory factor analysis of the TOSCA in
comparison to competing measures of these constructs, Ferguson and Crowley (1994,
1997) demonstrated that the latent variables shame and guilt are highly correlated
constructs (r = .91). They also found very small correlations between the TOSCA guilt
scale and other measures of guilt. Most importantly, they found that the TOSCA guilt
scale consisted almost entirely of error variance. Similarly, Elison (2001) conducted a
factor analysis on multiple shame and guilt scales and failed to find two distinct factors
for shame and guilt. Using multidimensional scaling (MDS) to assess shame, guilt,
humiliation, and embarrassment, Elison and Harter (2007) also found that the terms
shame and guilt were chosen for identical sets of vignettes. These studies call attention
to the limited evidence supporting the discriminant validity of the two TOSCA scales.
The guilt scale’s construct validity actually appears nil. They further reveal the limited
evidence for the convergent validity of the TOSCA with other measures of guilt.
Similar to the conclusions offered in empirical investigations of the TOSCA,
Sabini and Silver (1997) and others have harshly criticized Tangney’s conceptualization
of these two emotions (see also Ferguson, 1999). Sabini and Silver eloquently stated that
instead of attempting to distinguish between the two emotions, it is important not to
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segregate them because “without the bite of shame, guilt lacks force.” (p. 12). Further,
they stated that “Tangney’s analysis too thoroughly dissociates shame from guilt,
character from action. Acts for which we are guilty […] do involve the self. And
because they involve the self, they involve shame” (p. 8). Through this
conceptualization, it is not only unnecessary, but theoretically unsound to overly
discriminate between shame and guilt.

TOSCA: Operationalization Criticisms
Not only has the TOSCA been criticized because the definitions behind the
TOSCA overdiscriminate between the two emotions, but many researchers have begun to
question the validity of the items used to operationalize shame and guilt, thus questioning
the content validity of the TOSCA (Elison, 2002, 2003a; Ferguson et al., 2007; Luyten et
al., 2002). More specifically, Elison (2002) evaluated the TOSCA’s shame and guilt
items and found that the shame responses represented by the TOSCA are defined as a
subjective feeling state, whereas the guilt responses are operationalized as reparative
behaviors and cognitions. To elaborate, Elison (2002) found that
most (8.5) of the shame items are highly emotional with some involving
avoidance (3) and self-critical thoughts (4.5). On the other hand, most of
the 15 guilt items are behavioral or cognitive involving apologies (2),
attempts to make reparation (5.5), or thoughts that one should or could
have acted otherwise (6); the only feelings mentioned are regret (once),
unhappy (once), and feeling deserving of reprimand (once). (p. 67,
emphasis in original)
From this analysis, it appears that shame and guilt are operationalized quite differently,
and that guilt as represented by the TOSCA hardly seems like an emotion at all (Ortony,
1987).
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In addition to the above-noted operational problems regarding the TOSCA’s guilt
and shame responses, many researchers have questioned the TOSCA because it fails to
measure adaptive aspects of shame or maladaptive aspects of guilt (Elison, 2002, 2003a;
Ferguson et al., 2007; Ferguson & Stegge, 1998; Luyten et al., 2002; Sabini & Silver,
1997). In an item-by-item analysis of the TOSCA, Luyten and colleagues (2002) stated
that just because the TOSCA shame scale is positively correlated with many maladaptive
traits does not indicate that shame is necessarily maladaptive, because a close
examination of the TOSCA revealed that “this scale only measures maladaptive thoughts
or behaviors associated with shame” (p. 1380). Sabini and Silver agreed with this notion,
and argued that the TOSCA shame scale largely neglects the more adaptive aspects of
shame, and instead only measures the maladaptive qualities associated with this emotion.
Similar issues arise after inspection of the items comprising the TOSCA guilt scale.
When assessing the TOSCA guilt items, Luyten and colleagues indicated that
“concerning guilt, which is measured in the TOSCA as an adaptive and constructive
emotion, associated with reparative behavior, it is not surprising that this scale is
unrelated to indices of intrapersonal maladjustment” (p. 1383).
Similar to the sentiments of Luyten and colleagues (2002), Ferguson and Eyre
(1998) noted that the TOSCA scenarios are transgressions of a mild, incidental, or even
accidental nature; situations for which the most appropriate response would be guilt, not
shame. Because guilt is the most appropriate response in these contexts, it is
unsurprising that strong guilt endorsements to these scenarios would be correlated with
adaptive, rather than maladaptive outcomes. Instead, the TOSCA scenarios should elicit
both emotions to the same intensity. In a separate investigation of the TOSCA, Ferguson
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and Crowley (1994) have also criticized the content validity of the TOSCA items. These
researchers noted that the TOSCA shame items have a “ruminative” quality that the
TOSCA guilt items do not, thus operationalizing shame as more maladaptive. To
investigate this claim, they modified the TOSCA guilt descriptors by adding to each
descriptor the ruminative quality characteristic of the TOSCA’s shame descriptors. In
this study, they showed that the ruminative guilt items correlated with both the original
TOSCA guilt and shame items, and importantly, the ruminative guilt items “behaved” no
differently than TOSCA shame items in their relation to maladaptive outcomes.
Apparently noting the absence of maladaptive responses to guilt, Tangney herself
(Tangney & Dearing, 2002) developed a maladaptive guilt scale for the TOSCA. It
failed to demonstrate any degree of discriminant validity with regard to the TOSCA
shame scale; not only was the correlation between the two high (r = .79), the correlation
was as high as typical values of coefficient alpha for the TOSCA shame scale. Its failure
supports the criticisms here regarding the maladaptive operationalization of TOSCA
shame and the adaptive operationalization of TOSCA guilt: when the TOSCA guilt scale
is operationalized with a focus on the maladaptive, ruminative, and painful qualities
associated with guilt instead of solely assessing adaptive qualities, the TOSCA guilt scale
behaves similarly to the TOSCA shame scale (i.e., with its focus on the maladaptive
aspects of shame). It is clear from these observations that the validity of the conclusions
from the TOSCA can and should be questioned, because the complexity of shame and
guilt as constructs are insufficiently represented.
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TOSCA: Statistical Criticisms
Lastly, beyond the definitional and operational criticisms, the prominent
statistical method of partialing employed by many shame and guilt researchers using the
TOSCA has come into question (Elison, 2003a, 2003b; Elison, Ferguson, Dansie, &
Haycock, 2007; Ferguson & Stegge, 1998). Although the TOSCA operationalizes shame
and guilt as very distinct constructs, Tangney has found that shame and guilt share a
great amount of variance, with correlations ranging from .43 to .48 (Tangney, Wagner, &
Gramzow, 1992). Because of this shared variance, Tangney and colleagues reason that it
is more important for researchers to evaluate shame-free guilt’s and guilt-free shame’s
contributions to various outcomes. Thus, the partialing procedure is used to remove from
each emotion score the variance associated with the other emotion score, leaving
residualized shame and guilt scores that are “better” predictors than when partialing has
not been used (Tangney & Dearing, 2002). This very technique has been criticized
(Elison, 2003b; Ferguson & Stegge), because what is being partialed out may be the most
valid and important variance, that is, negative, self-directed affect.
The definitional history of the usages of shame and guilt, theoretical
conceptualizations, and quantitative studies provide evidence that partialing shame from
guilt and vice versa is a misguided technique. As discussed previously, terms for shame
encompassed guilt for a long period of time (246 years in the English language; OED,
Simpson & Weiner, 1989) and hundreds of years in other cultures such as Greek
(Williams, 1993). Because the definitional distinction between these two terms is fuzzy,
after statistically removing what is similar between these two states, it is difficult to
interpret what remains. In no instance, moreover, has Tangney or anyone actually
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demonstrated that what results from the partialing procedure resembles their original
conceptualization of guilt or shame. Furthermore, theoretical conceptualizations of the
two emotions show a high degree of overlap; both shame and guilt are considered selfconscious (Lewis, 1991) and social emotions (Barrett, 1995) that are linked to creating
positive impressions in the minds of others (Barrett; Cooley, 1964; Gilbert, 2007; Scheff,
1988). Moreover, the theoretical underpinnings the TOSCA was based upon, Lewis’s
(1971) model, supposed that shame and guilt co-occur. Given these considerations,
partialing one emotion from another cannot be supported theoretically (T. J. Ferguson,
personal communication, April 15, 2007). Although other distinctions have been
hypothesized (public/private and nonmoral/moral), these distinctions have not been
supported empirically (Tangney & Dearing, 2002). Finally, the quantitative studies
presented above (Elison, 2001; Elison & Harter, 2007; Ferguson & Crowley, 1994, 1997;
Kugler & Jones, 1992;) provide support for the supposition that there is little evidence for
distinguishing between the two emotions, with some correlations between the two
emotions ranging as high as .91 (Ferguson & Crowley, 1997). For example, it makes
little sense to partial heart rate from blood pressure because they are so intimately linked.
With such a high degree of covariance, partialing may remove the vast majority of valid
variance.
In addition to conceptual objections to partialing when substantial covariance
exists, the validity of partial correlations in these cases is questionable. Not only is it
difficult to interpret the meaning of resulting partial correlations, but with so much valid
variance removed, the potential to magnify systematic error is high. Rather than
purifying the association with criterion variables (as Tangney suggests), partialing may
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reduce validity by creating residualized scores that contain a greater proportion of
systematic error than the original scores. As examples of systematic error, the TOSCA
guilt scale has been found to be contaminated by socially desirable responding, while the
TOSCA shame scale overrepresents maladaptive responses. The TOSCA guilt scale is
especially susceptible to a specific type of socially desirable responding called
impression management, which can be defined as a response bias used to make oneself
look better to others (Paulhus, 1991). When partialing is used, the presumed valid
variance shared by shame and guilt is removed, leaving systematic error in the
residualized scores. Specifically, when partialing shame from guilt, a much higher
portion of the variance accounted for by impression management is left to covary with
other variables, thus making guilt appear more strongly related to other positive
characteristics. Conversely, when partialing guilt from shame, a much higher portion of
the variance accounted for by maladaptive responding is left to covary with other
variables, thus making shame look more negative (Elison, 2003b; Elison et al., 2007;
Elison, Dansie, Ferguson, & Webb, 2008).
A final statistical criticism, grounded in conceptualizations of emotions and their
regulation, is addressed by Ferguson and Stegge (1998). These authors note that a
curvilinear association between shame and guilt proneness and outcome variables may be
more plausible than the linear correlation presumed and tested by the users of the
TOSCA (Ferguson & Stegge, 1998). They assert that “many negligible correlations
between guilt and maladaptive symptoms, or shame and adaptive ones, could be masking
a true non-linear association for both emotion traits” (p. 53). In Ferguson and Stegge’s
view, the curvilinear association should take the form of an inverted-U, with shame and
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guilt being adaptive when experienced in moderate intensities. On the other hand,
problems may arise when experiences of shame and guilt become extreme (too low or too
high), thereby affecting (or reflecting) whether the individual will engage in appropriate
coping skills. For example, psychopaths are believed to experience little guilt, thus
causing multiple problems in relationships with others and hindering improvements in
their limited perspective-taking ability (Blair, Mitchell, & Blair, 2005). On the other end
of the spectrum, researchers have found that those individuals experiencing shame in
excessive amounts is positively correlated with maladaptive outcomes such as elevated
levels of depression or anger (Tangney & Dearing, 2002).
Importantly, Ferguson and Stegge’s (1998) perspective aligns with that of many
experts in the field of emotion, specifically emotion regulation, who emphasize that
emotions simply “are” and do not in themselves lead to positive or negative adjustment
(e.g., Cole, Michel, & Teti, 1994; Watson & Clark, 1992). Ferguson and Stegge
discussed many likely contributors to how adaptive a particular emotional experience
proves to be. Among these, they stressed characteristics of the emotional experience
itself, including its intensity or frequency, its appropriateness to the eliciting event, and
whether it resulted from reality-based appraisals of the event and their role in its
occurrence. Therefore, it is not guilt or shame (in the form of a state or trait per se) that
is necessarily adaptive or maladaptive, but instead the experience of these emotions at
appropriate levels, at appropriate times, and characteristics of the emotional experience
that leads to their adaptive qualities.
Importantly, although the TOSCA was created to assess shame- and guiltproneness as traits, results from this measure have been routinely generalized to
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conclusions drawn not only about shame and guilt as traits, but also as states. A striking
example of this overgeneralization is Tangney and Dearing’s position that shame may no
longer be adaptive, that we may even be evolving away from shame, and that “guilt may
be the moral emotion of the new millennium” (Tangney & Dearing, 2002, p. 127). States
and traits differ in that, although all individuals have the capacity to experience fleeting
moments of both shame and guilt during their lifetime (e.g., state), certain individuals
have a propensity or proneness to experience shame or guilt across a variety of situations
(e.g., trait). More specifically, state refers to how a person is feeling “in the moment,”
and measures assessing state emotions thus asking about how a person is feeling at the
moment they are completing the measure. In contrast, trait or proneness instead refers to
how the individual tends to feel over a certain time period, such as in the past three
months. Importantly, the same items can be used to assess traits or states, with only the
instructions changing. For example, the TOSCA asks respondents to imagine themselves
in hypothetical situations, as opposed to how they are really feeling in the moment. They
are then asked to indicate the “likelihood” that they would respond with shame and/or
guilt. In her review of the diverse array of methods that have been used to assess shame
and guilt, Tangney (1996) discussed how scenario-based measures such as the TOSCA
and SCAAI were developed explicitly to assess shame and guilt as a trait, and
specifically distinguished between assessments developed for state and trait shame/guilt.
Some readers might doubt the present study’s relevance to the TOSCA’s validity,
because this study concentrates on guilt and shame as states, instead of traits. Essential
to note, however, is that it is not Tangney’s overgeneralization from state to trait that
necessarily poses the problem. As mentioned above, it is not the experience of emotions
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as state or traits that necessarily leads to adaptive/maladaptive outcomes. An individual
can possess a predisposition or tendency to experience shame or guilt, but if experienced
at appropriate times, intensities, and in the right context, either emotional response could
be considered quite adaptive. Rather, the problem with this overgeneralization arises
because results from the TOSCA misrepresent shame and guilt both as states and traits.
In fact, results of this present study, when combined with previous efforts, could suggest
that criticisms of the TOSCA are valid and that those using the TOSCA are drawing
inappropriate conclusions regarding shame or guilt as either states or traits.
In summary, the measurement of shame and guilt when using the TOSCA is far
from perfect, which may lead researchers to draw inappropriate conclusions about the
true nature of either experience or their associations to other measures. To further
exacerbate the problem, widespread use of partialing in this context may intensify the
problem of researchers concluding that shame is maladaptive and guilt adaptive. Thus,
an alternative method for operationalizing and measuring these emotions is sorely
needed.

Functional Analyses of Shame and Guilt

As has been previously emphasized, the seemingly maladaptive nature of shame
may be due to the many flaws in the gold standard instrument most commonly used to
assess shame and guilt. One specific flaw emphasized was the TOSCA’s inadequate
conceptualization and operationalization of shame and guilt (Tangney et al., 1989),
resulting in shame appearing maladaptive and potentially harmful (Tangney & Dearing,
2002). In this section, I review the two major theories of emotion that were driven
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specifically by an evolutionary perspective and that consider guilt and/or shame to be
central emotions. From this viewpoint, emotions are seen as psychological adaptations
(Plutchik, 1962). Following a review of this literature, the author proposes an
evolutionarily based operationalization of shame, which may more accurately capture the
adaptive qualities of this emotion.
At least since the time of recorded history, philosophers and scientists, including
Aristotle, Plato, Descartes, or Hume, have speculated about the importance of emotions.
Some early psychological theorizing treated emotions as useless (Skinner, 1948), and
actually advocated that emotions are disorganizing and disruptive to human behavior
(Dewey, 1895). Other theorists, such as Darwin (1872), viewed emotions as evolving
because of the adaptive behaviors they promoted. He believed the social communication
and behavior-regulation functions they serve today were by-products, secondary to their
original functions (e.g., survival and reproduction). So, for example, experiencing fear
readies an individual for action in order to escape a dangerous situation, but now also
functions to communicate to conspecifics that danger is approaching. Like Darwin,
Tooby and Cosmides (1992) proposed that emotions evolved to assist our hunter-gatherer
ancestors with survival and reproduction. Similar to these aforementioned viewpoints is
the common view in evolutionary psychology, which is that emotions continue to serve
an adaptive purpose by helping individuals with successfully navigating and solving
physical as well as social problems in their environment (Ekman, 1992; Keltner & Gross,
1999). The concept of adaptiveness in this context can be defined as genetically
influenced attributes (e.g., emotions, cognitions, behaviors) that promote the replication
of genes, and over many generations, this reproduction of genes allows the attributes
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themselves to become more common in species’ genetic design (Tooby & Cosmides,
2005). Importantly, increased group cohesion, strengthened social bonds, trust between
group members, and reduced conflict or aggression, all are promoted through group
members’ abilities to express and interpret emotions appropriately. This in turn is one
contributor to individuals’ likelihood of successfully sexually reproducing and thriving in
their social and physical environment.

Early Biological Views of Shame
and Guilt: Tomkins and Izard
In addition to the adaptive nature of emotions in general, certain theorists have
explored the adaptive nature of shame and guilt in particular, and their functions in a
social context. Earlier theorists such as Tomkins and Izard addressed this topic.
Tomkins actually was one of the first to provide a thorough analysis of shame and other
affective states grounded in biology and evolutionary theory. In Tomkins’ analysis,
“affects” are the
correlated sets of responses involving the facial muscles, the viscera, the
respiratory system, the skeleton, autonomic blood flow changes, and
vocalizations that act together to produce an analogue of the particular
gradient or intensity of stimulation impinging on an organism. (Demos,
1995, p. 19)
When considering this description of affect, the question arises as to what then is the
definition of emotion. Many definitions of emotions exist in the literature, without
consensus regarding which is correct. For the purposes of the current review, a
functionalist definition of emotion will be considered, which is multifaceted and actually
subsumes Tomkins definition of affect. Thus, emotion is considered as a complex of
components (e.g., antecedents, action tendencies, subjective experiences, physiological

34
indicators, facial expressions, adaptive functions, and vocalic patterns) that impact
behavior. Further, the processes of emotion are: (a) bidirectional, in which emotions
involve the impact of the organism on the environment and vice versa; (b) relational, in
which how the event affects the organism impacts the quality of the event; and (c)
significant, where the bidirectional relationship between the organism and environment
has implications for how effectively the organism functions in that environment (Barrett
& Campos, 1987). When considering this definition, it is clear that Tomkins’ definition
of affect corresponds to some of the components of emotion as defined, such as facial
expressions, vocalic patterns, and physiological indicators.
Tomkins (1963) proposed the existence of nine basic or innate affects, which are
interest, enjoyment, surprise, fear, anger, distress, shame, contempt, and disgust (or
“dissmell” referring to disgust’s olfactory variant). As the above quote reveals, Tomkins
viewed each affect as a set of unique or distinct biological features (see Demos, 1995).
Tomkins was very precise about the mechanisms activating each of these nine distinct
affects. Recall that each affect can be described in terms of particular facial, muscular,
skeletal, visceral, circulatory, respiratory, and vocal characteristics. Combined, each
profile is associated with a certain density or frequency of neural firing. Tomkins argued
that the specific affect activated will depend on several facets of neural density per a
given unit of time, namely, how dense the neural activation is, how suddenly (versus
slowly) a given degree of neural density occurs, for how long (or short) a period of time
that degree of density is sustained, and for how long (or short) a period of time the
highest density takes to decline or degrade.
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What, then, are shame or guilt when viewed from Tomkins’ analysis of the nine
innate and biologically describable affects? In his view (1963), the affect of shame
involves a particular “central assembly” of biological reactions, corresponding to
precisely specifiable patterns of neural firing. Even without measurement of the neural
activation pattern, Tomkins asserted that the affect of shame has occurred when people
display a lowering of the eyelids, a lowered tonus of all facial muscles, a lowering of the
head, and a unilateral tilting of the head in one direction. People will experience this
affective assembly in a wide variety of situations that differ markedly from each other in
terms of the cognized causes or consequences of the experience and the needed resulting
behaviors. Stated differently, at the level of affect, the shame experience will be identical
across these otherwise discrepantly perceived situations.
Consider examples of four situations. In one situation, the person’s affective
experience of shame might be labeled as shame in the sense of feeling inferior (e.g.,
falling short of an achievement standard). In another situation, the same affective
experience of shame might be identified as “feeling guilty,” because the person attributes
the activated pattern of shame affect to the self for having violated a moral norm. Even
in the latter situation, again involving the same underlying affective experience of shame,
another person might consciously feel “ashamed of myself,” in this case because one part
of the self, as an observer, feels ashamed of another part of the self, as an actor who
behaved immorally. Finally, in a fourth situation, the perceiver might experience the
affect of shame, but identify the feeling as shyness, because the perceiver has
encountered a person who initially looked familiar, but who suddenly appeared strange to
the perceiver.
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Important to remember is that the affect experienced in all four situations
involves the same central assembly of shame, but each is coupled with differing
cognitions about the experience’s causes, consequences, and resultant behaviors. When
the basic affect of shame is combined with differing cognitions about an event’s causes,
consequences, or later action tendencies, this renders a different “total” or “entire”
experience in Tomkins’ terms. One might label this total experience an emotional one, in
line with the functionalists’ preference, described earlier, to define emotions in terms of
their multiple affective or experiential, cognitive, and action tendency components.
Based on this description of Tomkins’ analysis, it is apparent that he did not view
guilt as a unique affect. He, instead, conceptualized guilt as one of several “cognitive
scripts” that people learn to associate with the core affect of shame, experienced in the
context of moral transgressions (1963, 1987). In his view, shame motivates individuals
to behave according to the norms of the social group, because the individual is acting to
avoid feeling shame. Tomkins also contended that shame is more effective than any
other affect in calling attention to the weaknesses and functioning of the self and thereby
promoting the acquisition of skills and competencies. From Tomkins (1962, 1963), he
proposed that shame’s innate activator is the “incomplete reduction” of interest or joy; or,
as he tried to communicate differently, shame will be evoked by perceived barriers to
interest or excitement (e.g., encountering a stranger). Shame thus functions as an innate
“affect auxiliary.” That is, one affect (shame) serves to inhibit the pursuit of stimuli
leading to the continued experience of other affects, namely, interest or joy.
Highly influenced by the ideas of Tomkins (1963), Izard (1977) also contended
that emotions evolved to assist individuals with effectively functioning in their
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environment. By also taking a biological perspective, Izard asserted that shame has two
evolutionary functions. He argued that (a) “shame sensitizes the individual to the
opinions and feelings of others and thus acts as a force for social cohesion” and
conformity (p. 400), and (b) shame evolved to promote the acquisition of skills and
competencies that are necessary for survival. Thus, to avoid shame, individuals are
motivated to acquire skills that that will assist them with surviving in their environment.
Importantly, he and Tomkins (1963) agreed that even infants can experience shame, and
as early as 4 or 5 months of age. As long as there can be a sudden reduction of the
experience of interest or joy, infants can experience shame. So, for example, if an infant
is experiencing joy when looking at the face of its mother and suddenly encounters the
face of a stranger, which thus inhibits the pursuit of the source of joy (e.g., the mother’s
face), the infant is vulnerable to the experience of shame (Izard, 1977; Tomkins, 1963).
Thus, the experience of shame is unlearned.
Izard (1977) similarly argued that guilt, as well as shame, emerged through
evolutionary processes and is unlearned. Similar to Tomkins (1963), Izard stated that
guilt is the emotion that is most highly associated with patterns of moral behavior. He
further stated that through evolutionary processes, the experience of guilt hinders
aggressive or sexual exploitation. Also, the anticipation of experiencing guilt fosters a
sense of personal responsibility and strongly motivates reparative behavior. Unlike
shame, which can be experienced in young infants, Izard contends that children can only
experience guilt when they are cognitively able to understand that their actions can harm
other individuals. This does not mean children have to learn to experience guilt, but
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understand that their behavior can impact others. This ability has been seen in children
as young as 1 1/2 years (Izard, 1977).

General Social Psychological Tradition
Since the time that Tomkins or Izard introduced the view that shame and guilt
serve numerous adaptive functions, many scholars have echoed agreement with this
stance. The purpose of this section is to describe these more recent ideas about each
state’s adaptive functions.
Desires to minimize embarrassment or shame explain a diversity of behaviors,
ranging from the expected (e.g., self-handicapping, externalizing) to the unexpected (e.g.,
obedience to authority, conformity to obviously wrong answers, intervening to help in an
emergency situation, offers to accept electric shock on behalf of a distressed coparticipant, cf. Sabini, Siepmann, & Stein, 2001; Scheff, 1988). Scheff, in fact, labeled
shame as the “master emotion” that functions within a deference-emotion system as an
informal sanction in the form of actual or perceived rejection for failures to adhere to
group norms. Certain behaviors supposedly motivated by shame certainly can be
evaluated negatively (e.g., obeying an authority in the Milgram, 1965, studies, or not
standing up for one’s own perceptions in the Asch, 1955, conformity paradigm). Yet,
other behaviors that shame purportedly facilitated were admirable (e.g., accepting pain to
spare another; helping others). This contrast is reminiscent of the earlier summarized
view of emotion researchers that emotions themselves are neither adaptive nor
maladaptive.
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In discussing a functional model of self-conscious emotions, Parker (1998)
proposed that shame functions to reduce exposure by distancing the shamed person from
others in their social environment and that shame communicates submission, which in
turn limits damage or harm. Guilt, in contrast, functions to repair damage and
communicates that the guilty person is aware of their guilt, and intends to behave
differently. Fessler (2003) contended that emotions are essential to survival because they
promote cooperative relationships, and shame functions to alert the individual that they
have violated a norm or are not conforming to social standards. Greenberg and Paivio
(1997) also agreed that guilt is about rectifying unacceptable behavior, and described
shame nicely when they stated:
Shame in its most fundamental adaptive form is possibly a process of
protecting our social connectedness. Shame has to do with our
acceptability, worth, and connection to others. […] Shame is a signal that
my worth or state of social connection is threatened or needs attention. (p.
208)
Not only are shame and guilt considered functional from a general psychological
perspective, but researchers viewing emotions from an evolutionary perspective have
also proposed functional accounts of shame and guilt. In the following section, three
major evolutionary models, termed “damage limitation,” “social self-preservation
theory,” and “appeasement” will be discussed.

Evolutionary Social Psychological Perspectives
Along with specifying the adaptive functions of shame and guilt, some
researchers have given much attention to the selection pressures that lead to the current
form and functions of shame and guilt (Barrett & Campos, 1987). Noteworthy is that
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these researchers have focused on shame to a greater degree than guilt, consistent with
the view that shame and guilt are highly related constructs. Thus, in the following
sections, more emphasis will be placed on the exploration of shame, rather than guilt,
because many of these researchers do not directly address guilt as a separate construct.
The functions that shame and guilt serve have been explored through three paradigms,
namely “damage limitation,” “social self-preservation theory,” and “appeasement.”
These three paradigms emphasize similar selection pressures and agree about the
functions that shame and guilt serve. The unique facets of the damage limitation, socialself-preservation, and the appeasement paradigms are discussed in turn, below.
Gilbert and McGuire (1998) contended that shame evolved by social selection, is
typically triggered by a social threat, and activates an involuntary submissive response in
those individuals feeling shame, which functions to de-escalate conflict. Thus, shame is
a “damage limitation strategy.” To elaborate, Gilbert (1997) contended that successfully
navigating our environment depends on our ability to gain access to resources,
reproductive opportunities, and protection, and these goals are more easily accessible
when one maintains status and acceptance in a social group. One crucial method used to
achieve status, acceptance, and to maintain social bonds is through our ability to appear
attractive, in the broadest sense of any attribute judged positively by others. He termed
this ability to achieve and maintain attractiveness, and thus acceptance by others as social
attraction holding power (SAHP). Without the ability to elicit positive feelings in others,
we may experience a decrease in status that results in losing the many benefits available
to those at higher levels in status-based hierarchies. Gilbert stated:
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The central function of shame is to alert the self to actual or possible
losses of SAHP and prime submissive strategies which include desires to
escape, hide and conceal, and to signal to others that one is submitting, not
fighting back and recognizes that a loss of SAHP has taken place. (p. 122,
1997)
Experiencing shame thus warns individuals that some characteristic of theirs is receiving
diminished value and/or that this diminished characteristic might possibly reduce their
SAHP. This activates an involuntary response that signals to others in the social group
that they are aware of the threat and that no further devaluations are necessary, thus
limiting additional damage. Guilt, on the other hand, evolved out of a desire to “keep the
other functioning well […] but having failed to do so” (p. 139). Therefore, guilt
motivates the individual to repair the wrong done.
In direct agreement with Gilbert’s contentions regarding the functions of shame is
Gruenwald and colleague’s (2007) social-self-preservation theory, which also includes
the damage-limitation strategies of appeasement and submission. What sets this program
of research apart from Gilbert’s (1997) hypothesis of SAHP is the great amount of
empirical, physiological evidence supporting Gruenwald and colleagues’ assertions about
shame and the social self. These researchers asserted that
shame appears to be a common emotional response to threat to the social
self, the activation of specific physiological systems often accompanies
shame responses to social-self threat, and these psychobiological
responses are associated with specific behavioral reactions (e.g.,
appeasement, submission) to such threats. (p. 69)
Shame thus evolved to assist individuals with maintaining a positive social self, which is
essential to survival, opportunities for reproduction, and maintaining supportive
relationships (Gruenwald et al.). Importantly, these researchers did not address guilt
specifically, as they contended that guilt is a variant of shame (Gruenwald et al.).
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The following studies support the idea that (a) social threats elicit physiological
responses; (b) physiological responses are, indeed, associated with shame; and (c)
physiological responses are associated with submissive behaviors, which align with
shame’s hypothesized function. Consistent evidence has been found in investigations of
physiological activity such as specific patterns of neuroendocrine and immune response.
Gruenwald and colleagues (2007) hypothesized that activation of the hypothalamicpituitary-adrenal (HPA) and proinflammatory immune systems, which are activated in
times of stress (e.g., social devaluation), would result when threat to the social self
occurs. Importantly, they asserted that these physiological markers are associated with
the shame experience. A meta-analysis conducted by Dickerson and Kemeny (2004),
which reviewed 208 laboratory investigations examining the effects of acute stressors on
cortisol levels (produced by the HPA system), provided support for this premise. The
effect size for cortisol increases reported in this review was much higher in studies that
utilized a social evaluative threat paradigm (d = .67) than in studies not including a
social-evaluative threat component (d = .21); importantly, a shame display was correlated
with increases in cortisol levels.
Dickerson, Kemeny, Aziz, Kim, and Fahey (2004) also conducted a study
demonstrating the relation between proinflammatory cytokines (also released in times of
stress) and shame. In this study, students were instructed to write about either a neutral
topic or one in which they blamed themselves. Students in the blame condition who
showed greater increases in shame also showed greater increases in their
proinflammatory immune responses, indicating an association between shame and
physiological stress. Gruenwald and colleagues (2007) also reviewed evidence for the
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relation between submissive behaviors, including that of a shame display, and the activity
of HPA hormones in nonhuman animals. Importantly, similar conclusions were drawn
for rats, mice, monkeys, baboons, tree shrews, and fish. Taken together, these studies
paint a clear picture that when shame is induced, submissive behaviors are elicited, and
these are correlated with specific physiological profiles.
Other researchers have similarly suggested that shame functions as an
appeasement mechanism to reestablish social harmony after a violation or transgression
(Keltner & Harker, 1998). Moreover, at the heart of the appeasement display in humans
as well as nonhuman animals is submissiveness (de Waal, 1988). Although Keltner and
colleagues typically receive credit for these ideas (e.g., Keltner & Harker), sociologists
such as Scheff (1988) have long recognized the appeasement functions that shame serves.
Scheff instead refers to this function as the “deference-emotion system,” but both
recognized that experiencing shame warns the individual of potential devaluation, thus
promoting conformity and limiting damage to the social self. Keltner and associates
contend that appeasement can function in situations of perceived or actual conflict that
are social in nature and “leads to social reconciliation by signaling the individual’s
commitment to the social norms and by evoking emotions that increase cooperation (e.g.,
sympathy, forgiveness) and reduce aggression” (p. 363). Keltner and colleagues also
contend that appeasement can take two forms. Reactive forms of appeasement function
when actual conflict has occurred, while anticipatory forms of appeasement function to
prevent conflict that has not yet occurred. Again, these researchers do not specify unique
functions for guilt separate from shame.
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Clearly, similarities exist between shame as a “damage limitation strategy,” as
“social self-preservation,” and shame as appeasement. These three conceptualizations
combine to portray a coherent picture of the evolutionarily adaptive functions of shame.
The basic premise in each is that the experience of shame evolved to help individuals
successfully navigate their social environments and assisted individuals in maintaining
important social relationships.
These analyses also stress the roles of our appearance and behavior in the eyes of
others as sources of potential shame. Central within the damage limitation strategy is the
idea that we all have a need to appear attractive to others to maintain our SAHP; SAHP,
in turn, affects access to various resources essential to survival; and shame is a warning
signal that we may not appear attractive to those in our social group (Gilbert, 1997;
Gilbert & McGuire, 1998). Similar ideas have been expressed by proponents of social
self-preservation theory (Gruenwald et al., 2007). The idea that shame serves as an
appeasement mechanism is also extremely similar, but more emphasis is placed on shame
functioning to elicit submissive behaviors that will reduce aggression in others, rather
than warning us that certain behaviors or characteristics may lead others to devalue us
(Keltner & Harker, 1998).
To summarize, from both a general social psychological perspective and
evolutionary perspective, shame serves many adaptive functions that are essential to the
survival of human and nonhuman species. This conclusion is in direct contradiction to
the findings regarding shame in studies that use the TOSCA. As was previously
discussed, the TOSCA has been criticized on both theoretical and methodological
grounds. One of the criticisms directed at the TOSCA is a biased operationalization of

45
shame and guilt. In order to improve on previous shame and guilt research, and attempt
to resolve this contradiction, research using a more evolutionarily based
operationalization of shame is needed. If shame is elicited in social contexts and serves
the adaptive function of social self-preservation (i.e., damage-limitation) through
appeasement and submission, then perhaps it should be operationalized as the latter. In
the following section, an operationalization of shame rooted in evolutionary theory will
be proposed.

Communication of Shame and Guilt

Nonverbal Displays of Shame and Guilt
Many researchers (Darwin, 1872; Ekman, 1992; Izard, 1977; Tomkins, 1964)
agree that emotion displays, specifically those expressed through the face provide
efficient and reliable indicators that are adaptive for individuals in their social
environment. As indicated, they provide information not only about the emotion the
individual may be feeling, but also information about antecedent events and future
behavior. Facial expressions additionally function to evoke emotions in others (Darwin).
Tomkins (1987) went so far as to propose that affects are nothing without facial
expression. In fact, Tomkins has contended that affect is principally facial behavior,
while inner bodily sensations are of secondary importance to the expression of emotion
through the face. If emotion displays serve these functions, it comes as no surprise that
the facial/bodily expression of shame would also serve adaptive functions by allowing
the emotion shame to be communicated and understood by others.
In studying shame, researchers have proposed a unique pattern of nonverbal
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behavior for shame that is defined by several submissive behaviors. This display is
characterized by the lowering of the head, gaze aversion, and postural shrinkage (Darwin,
1872; Gilbert & McGuire, 1998; Izard, 1977; Keltner, 1995; Tomkins, 1963, 1987). As
stated previously, at the core of appeasement behavior is submission, thus shame
communicates appeasement to others through a unique submissive display. This
submissive display of shame has even been seen in other species (Keltner & Buswell,
1997). Specifically, one can observe expressions of shame (e.g., gaze aversion, postural
shrinkage) in nonhuman primates (e.g., bonobos, chimpanzees, orangutans, and gorillas)
known to be closely genetically related to human primates (de Waal, 1988). Similarly,
Keltner and Buswell reviewed 40 studies, and reported that the appeasement behaviors
considered functionally equivalent to the shame expression were evident in primates,
rodents, and birds. Along with cross-species similarity in shame’s expression, current
research has provided evidence for a universal display for shame (Izard, 1971; Keltner &
Buswell, 1996; Tomkins, 1964).
In some of the earliest research conducted to study the unique display of
emotions, Tomkins (1964) used photographs to determine how well participants could
accurately identify and label eight primary affects. In this study, 24 participants were
shown between seven and nine photographs of each primary affect, and they were asked
to identify which affect was being displayed by the models posing in the photographs.
Tomkins found that the average correlation between the affects posed in the photographs
and the judgments of the participants was .86, with the correlation for shame being .92.
Similarly, Izard (1971) presented still photographs of nine different emotions to
individuals in five countries. In each country, participants identified the shame display
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significantly more accurately than what would be expected by chance. Across these nine
different countries, the mean level of accuracy in identifying the shame expression was
65%, with chance level being 11%.
More recently, Keltner and colleagues conducted four studies to determine how
accurately the shame display could be accurately identified (Keltner, 1995; Keltner &
Buswell, 1996). In the first two studies, photographs of shame and 13 other emotions
were presented to participants, and they were asked to identify the emotion term that
represented the emotional expression in the photograph from a list of 13 emotion terms
(Haidt & Keltner, 1999; Keltner & Buswell, 1997). As in the study by Izard (1971),
participants identified shame with above chance accuracy in both studies: specifically,
51% of participants accurately identified the shame expression. In the third study, rather
than using still photographs, dynamic displays of shame were investigated in the form of
short video segments of individuals displaying shame. Participants in this study also
accurately identified shame at above chance levels. Finally, in the fourth study,
participants were asked to identify which out of nine emotions individuals in a short
video segment were expressing. Interestingly, participants’ endorsement of “shame” for
the individual’s expression in the video was correlated with displays of head movement
down, head movement to the side, and gaze lowering (Keltner), which also neatly
confirms Tomkins’ characterization of shame expressions (1964).
In contrast to the reliably identifiable facial expression of shame, researchers have
yet to determine a unique facial/bodily display for guilt (Ekman, 1992; Keltner &
Buswell, 1996; Tomkins, 1987). In his research on emotion, Darwin (1872) did not view
guilt as a unique affect as he did shame, but instead viewed guilt as a subset of shame
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that was associated with moral transgressions. Thus, he did not predict that guilt would
have a unique nonverbal display. Similarly, and as elaborated earlier, Tomkins
emphasized that there is no unique display for guilt, because shame and guilt are identical
affects at the level of affect. Thus, guilt was not included as one of the primary affects
that Tomkins (1964) studied. Because a unique display for guilt has not yet been
identified, Keltner and Buswell further pursued the matter, asking whether three
“candidate” expressions would be reliably identified as guilt. Participants were shown
photographs of emotions known to have well-established facial displays (e.g., anger, fear,
happiness), as well as likely displays of embarrassment, shame, and the candidate
expressions for guilt (i.e., expressions of self-contempt, sympathy, and pain). These
researchers found support for the supposition that there is no unique display of guilt, as
the three candidate guilt expressions were each identified as other emotions (e.g.,
sympathy, pain) more often than guilt. Importantly, many researchers consider shame to
be evolutionary “prior” to guilt, because of shame’s ability to be communicated readily
via facial and nonverbal displays, unlike guilt. From these evolutionary perspectives,
guilt is a more recent addition to human primates’ communicative language, (e.g.,
Ekman). Specifically, guilt is primarily expressed through verbal means (e.g., apologies,
confessions) or via overt behaviors that could, but do not necessarily, convey remorse or
contrition (e.g., the offer to make repair; doing favors for the harmed other; Ferguson et
al., 2007).

Vocalic Communication of Shame and Guilt
Clearly, evidence exists to support shame being accurately communicated through
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unique patterns of nonverbal displays, while no unique nonverbal display has been found
for guilt. Specific vocalic patterns for shame have also been examined. Hundreds of
studies have been conducted to identify specific vocalic patterns for many emotions (e.g.,
joy, sadness, fear, anger, etc.), and the overall conclusion is that crossculturally,
individuals can identify general emotion categories (e.g., anger, sadness, happiness, fear)
with above chance accuracy (see Juslin & Laukka, 2003 for a review). Unfortunately,
very few studies focused on the vocalic expression of emotions have included shame or
guilt. Furthermore, in the studies including shame or guilt, the authors actually treated
them as one in the same.
In a very early study conducted on the communication of emotion, Pfaff (1954)
found that participants could accurately identify 12 different emotional states from
vocalic patterns, without the addition of contextual cues. Although joy, fear, and hate
were more frequently correctly identified, shame and love were found to be the most
difficult, but participants still identified them with above chance accuracy. The next
study to be conducted on the recognition of vocal expressions of emotion to include
shame was completed in 1983 (Van Bezooijen et al.). In this study, Dutch, Taiwanese,
and Japanese participants were asked to identify emotions from distinct vocalic patterns.
Again, all emotions studied were accurately identified at above chance levels, with
shame, disgust, and contempt being the more difficult to identify (Van Bezooijen et al.).
Similar conclusions were also reached in a review conducted by Scherer (1986). Scherer
expected that participants would be unlikely to associate a particular vocalic pattern
specifically with shame. He did, however, expect that shame and guilt, presented as one
emotional state would be characterized by a “narrow,” thin, and tense voice (Scherer). In
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1996, Banse and Scherer also conducted a study on the recognition rates of emotions via
the vocalic mode. They found that, although some emotions were accurately identified,
shame and disgust had the lowest recognition rates. The authors suggested that shame
may have few unique vocalic features, because shame is characterized by avoidant
behaviors, which would lessen people’s tendencies to speak while mired in the shame
experience (Banse & Scherer). Finally, Barrett and Campos (1987; also cited in Barrett,
1995) adapted the predictions by Scherer, and contended that shame and guilt do, indeed,
have separate, distinct vocalic patterns. Although not citing any supportive data, they
state that shame is accompanied by a “narrow,” moderately lax, and thin voice, whereas
guilt is accompanied by a “narrow,” tense, moderately full voice.
In summary, in studies that have treated guilt and shame as distinct states,
individuals generally do associate the feeling of shame with a distinct vocalic pattern at a
level exceeding chance. Nonetheless, people more accurately identify shame based on
unique nonverbal displays. Conversely, there is no evidence of individuals perceiving
guilt to be associated with particular nonverbal or vocalic patterns. Considered together,
the findings suggest that while shame is reliably recognized as a distinct emotion based
on accepted indices involving facial, postural, or vocalic display modes, guilt is not
reliably distinguished or recognized based on these characteristics.

Physiological Indicators of Shame and Guilt
Because of the importance of communicating the experience of emotion,
researchers have not only investigated the unique nonverbal and vocalic patterns of
emotions, but have also attempted to determine unique physiological markers for
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different emotions. From an evolutionary perspective, if emotions evolved to assist an
organism with efficiently and effectively responding to the demands of the environment,
then one might expect that the autonomic nervous system (ANS) would be activated to
assist the organism in responding to these demands (Levenson, 1994). Moreover,
because unique, basic emotions (e.g., fear, sadness, anger, joy) evolved to assist
organisms with responding to different demands of the environment, it might be
hypothesized that each basic emotion evolved a unique pattern of physiological
responding. Evidence has been found supporting the long-debated assumption that there
are distinctive patterns of ANS activity for anger, fear, disgust, and sadness (Ekman,
1992; Ekman, Levenson, & Friesen, 1983; Levenson, Ekman, & Friesen, 1990). For
example, in one of the earliest studies investigating specific ANS activity for surprise,
disgust, anger, fear, sadness, and happiness, Ekman and colleagues found different
patterns of ANS activity distinguishing between positive (surprise, happiness) and
negative (disgust, anger, fear, sadness) emotions. Different ANS patterns additionally
were found among the four negative emotions examined. Using heart rate and finger
temperature to measure ANS activity, Levenson and colleagues found specific
physiological differences among the negative emotions of fear, anger, disgust, and
sadness. Similar results have been found across various cultures (e.g., Minangkabau,
United States), and ages (younger participants compared to those age 71-90; Levenson,
1992).
Unfortunately, shame and guilt have never been included in studies of patterns of
ANS activity characterizing different emotions. Barrett and Campos (1987; also cited in
Barrett, 1995), adapted the results of the study conducted by Ekman and colleagues
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(1983) to assert that both shame and guilt have distinctive physiological patterns. In their
view, individuals will manifest a low heart rate but high rates of blushing while
experiencing shame. In contrast, the experience of guilt presumably reflects a profile
involving high heart rate and skin conductance, but irregular respiration. Interestingly,
however, neither shame nor guilt were actually investigated in the Ekman and
colleagues’ study. Scherer and Wallbott (1994) did investigate physiological indicators of
eight emotions, including shame and guilt, but they employed a self-report questionnaire
to measure these. They found that people associate higher basal temperatures with the
experience of shame (perhaps reflecting their knowledge that people blush while feeling
ashamed). On the other hand, none of the physiologically oriented ratings uniquely
identified the feeling of guilt.
In summary, no studies have explicitly examined actual ANS activity patterns
that would be unique either to shame or to guilt. Based on the evidence reviewed thus far,
shame is communicated reliably through a distinctive nonverbal facial display, consisting
of lowering of the head, gaze aversion, and postural shrinkage (Darwin, 1872; Gilbert &
McGuire, 1998; Izard, 1977; Keltner, 1995; Tomkins, 1963, 1987). Moderate support
has been found for shame involving a distinctive vocalic pattern. In regard to guilt, no
distinctive nonverbal display, vocalic pattern, or ANS pattern has been found. All
evidence considered, it supports use in this study of the unique nonverbal display of
shame to communicate this experience after a transgression. Thus, in the following
sections, reference made to shame functioning or operationalized through an
“evolutionary perspective” will refer to shame defined by the unique, nonverbal display
of shame. Guilt, on the other hand, has been commonly characterized as being
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experienced in the context of a moral violation, functions to elicit reparative behaviors on
behalf of the guilty individual in the form of reparations and apologies, and maintains
prosocial behavior (Barrett & Campos, 1987; Tomkins, 1963). Because no unique facial,
vocalic or physiological evidence has been found for guilt, in the current study,
agreement as to guilt motivating reparative behavior in the form of apologies will be used
to support the treatment of guilt as such.

Evidence for Shame Displays Serving an
Appeasement Function

Just as ample evidence has been provided to support the assertion that shame is
reliably communicated via a unique display, in the following section, research will be
reviewed that supports the assertion that shame serves an appeasement function in social
relationships. Following this review of the appeasement literature, current methods used
to study appeasement will be reviewed and critiqued, supporting the contention that a
different method that more accurately captures the appeasement functions of shame is
needed.
Has the nonverbal display associated uniquely with shame been shown to serve
appeasement functions? Indeed it has. For example, Keltner and colleagues (1997)
found that when participants viewed photographs of shame and other emotions, but were
told to imagine the person in the photograph had failed during a class presentation,
photographs of a shame expression elicited more sympathy from the participants than did
photographs of embarrassment or any other emotional expressions In a related study
focusing on the remedial effects of appeasement displays, Keltner and associates (1998)
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had fraternity members and romantic partners tease each other. They found that the
relationships between those individuals were restored when individuals showed
appeasement-related submissive displays. Similarly, Semin and Manstead (1982)
showed participants a videotape of someone knocking over a store display, with the
transgressor reacting with either embarrassment or acting calmly, and the transgressor
either fixed the store display or just walked away. The results showed that individuals
who showed embarrassment (considered here a variant of shame) were more likely to be
forgiven and were considered more likeable by participants than someone who did not
exhibit embarrassment, regardless of whether they actually offered repair by fixing the
display.
This appeasement effect has even been studied with children and parents, where
parents reading vignettes about a child breaking a bottle of juice were more forgiving
toward the child the more embarrassed (or shameful) the parent believed the child to feel
(Semin & Papadopoulou, 1990). Edelmann (1982) also showed that an appeasement
display can have positive effects when a person must provide negative feedback to
someone else. Participants were told to give negative feedback to another individual,
who was actually an accomplice to the study, about their performance on a task. The
participants reported feeling more at ease and a greater liking of the accomplice who did
than who did not display embarrassment.
Not only has shame as appeasement been studied in contexts where the severity
of the transgression was minimal, but the functions of shame have also been studied in
the context of more severe mock criminal cases and jury trials. In fact, many of these
studies, conducted within the fields of sociology or criminal justice, predate the more
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famous studies cited earlier of psychologists, such as Keltner or Semin. Curiously,
moreover, these older studies are rarely acknowledged in the psychological literature.
Savitsky and Sim (1974), using videotapes, demonstrated that sentences and conviction
rates decreased when individuals displayed signs of remorse (e.g., shame). Similarly,
Lazowski (1988) showed that defendants on trial for crimes or misdemeanors were
judged more leniently when they exhibited behaviors that could be labeled “shame.”
Also using mock trials, Young and colleagues (1996) found similar results when the
defendant showed a shame display; the defendant was given a shorter sentence and was
eligible for parole earlier than those defendants that did not show shame. Tsoudis and
Smith-Lovin (1998) also used the jury paradigm, asking participants to read transcripts of
suspects’ statements and embedding within them descriptions of nonverbal behaviors
displayed by the suspects, while providing the statement. Participants reading transcripts
containing descriptions of nonverbal appeasement gestures recommended a less harsh
punishment and found the crime less severe than those who read transcripts depicting the
suspects’ reactions as “neutral.” Finally, the appeasement displays even of politicians
have been studied. For example, Masters (1988) demonstrated that the submissive or
appeasement displays of politicians were correlated with higher status and winning
elections more frequently.
From the literature reviewed thus far, it is clear that results support shame’s role
in limiting damage within social relationships via appeasement (Keltner & Harker, 1998;
Scheff, 1988). Consistent with Gilbert and McGuire’s (1998) assertion that shame acts
as a motivator for individuals to refrain from committing a transgression in the first
place, Ferguson and colleagues actually showed shame to play a major anticipatory role
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in helping American adults avoid making two types of behavioral mistakes, which they
labeled commission errors (actually engaging in undesirable or even immoral behaviors)
and omission errors (failing to pull through with socially valued behaviors) in a series of
four studies (Ferguson, Edmondson, & Gerity, 2000). Results from the same series of
studies also showed anticipatory guilt to minimize commission and omission errors.
Importantly, however, the anticipation of guilt proved more valuable for events that
respondents characterized as likely to hurt, anger, displease, or upset others.
Anticipatory shame, in contrast, was judged as more valuable for events that respondents
characterized as impugning their identities or integrity. Ferguson and colleagues
suggested that shame more than guilt was functioning as an internalized inhibitor of
potentially serious wrongdoings. As such, Ferguson and colleagues hypothesized that
people value shame more than guilt as an indicator of conscientiousness or moral virtue.
Results based on additional studies originating from Ferguson’s lab supported this
hypothesis (Ferguson et al., 2007). For example, observers of actors who portrayed
themselves as experiencing guilt but not shame following various misdeeds attributed
more negative personality characteristics (e.g., immoral, untrustworthy, unreliable) to
these actors than to those who reported experiencing both emotions. Similarly, but “in
reverse,” observers of actors who were portrayed as possessing various negative
personality characteristics predicted that these actors would later express high degrees of
guilt (but not shame) in response to different misdeeds. In contrast, observers expected
both high degrees of shame and guilt following the same wrongdoings when actors had
earlier been portrayed in positive terms (virtuous, conscientious). As a whole, results of
these studies underscored the greater power of shame than guilt expressions. Shame’s,
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more than guilt’s, expression produced stronger likeability judgments and more positive
character judgments; in fact, guilt’s presence resulted in positive judgments only when it
was combined with shame’s presence. Also important is that the findings seem to
provide evidence for Tomkins’ (1963) analysis of shame as the more fundamentally
important motivator of proper behavior, with guilt being more of an “add-on” component
addressing specific types of transgressions (i.e., in moral situations).
In a special issue of Child Maltreatment, Ferguson (2005) offered several
additional observations regarding shame’s adaptive value, thus taking a stance opposite
to that consistently expressed in this issue’s conceptual or empirical articles. She
observed that shame can function to appease or mitigate hostile reactions not only after
minor infractions within healthy intimate relationships or larger organizational ones, but
also within the physically abusive, emotionally abusive, and neglectful relationships
targeted in the special issue. This stance is opposite that of Bennett, Sullivan, and Lewis
(2005) in the same issue, who conducted an observational laboratory study examining
how very young recipients of physical abuse (and/or neglect) reacted to their failures
(induced by the experimenter) on relatively easy achievement tasks administered during
the session. They reported that the physically abused children, in particular, more often
expressed shame, which then fueled intense reactions of anger. This pattern aligns neatly
with what Lewis (1979) labeled the shame-rage cycle. Bennett and colleagues suggested
that these young children’s chronic exposure to physical abuse, and the behavioral
patterns they have learned, led to the extremely premature appearance of shame-rage
reactions. At the same time, however, Ferguson noted that Bennett and colleagues did
not record the chronological order in which children expressed shame or anger. The

58
opposite order of children first expressing anger followed by shame was, therefore, also a
logically feasible result.
Ferguson (2005) argued that the anger-to-shame or the shame-to-anger sequence
each were plausible for subgroups of these children, based on the two types of attachment
relationships known to characterize children subjected to physical abuse. Most
importantly, Ferguson argued that it made adaptive sense for most children in this study
to engage in the anger-to-shame sequence, given the probable quality of their attachment
relationship and interaction experiences in the home. She suggested that the children
might have first expressed angry frustration in response to failing relatively easy tasks.
But, because the children were aware of their parents’ past abusive reactions to their
expressions of anger in the home, the children were most likely to discontinue outward
expressions of anger, and instead experience shame after their failure. In essence, then,
Bennett and colleagues may have been the first to demonstrate in children the occurrence
of shame as an appeasement effort that would be adaptive in the most extreme
evolutionary terms (i.e., life saving), because expressing shame rather than anger in an
abusive home may function to stop further abuse on behalf of the parents.

Previous Methods for Assessing Appeasement
Qualities of Shame
Because shame and guilt are considered social emotions (Barrett, 1995), and thus
are inherently linked to the impressions that people form of the actor and to the actor’s
subsequent reputation and status within valued relationships or larger groups (Barrett;
Cooley, 1964; Gilbert, 2007; Scheff, 1988), it is especially pertinent to study the
appeasement functions shame serves in the context of actual social interactions.
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Unfortunately, few studies have examined shame and guilt during an ongoing interaction.
There also are next-to-no “in vivo” studies of whether both shame and guilt equally serve
the function of appeasement. In fact, studies of appeasement generally focus on shame
alone and conduct these in more artificial settings than ongoing interactions. Starting
with the latter issue, first, the author briefly summarizes and critiques methodologies
used to assess the appeasement functions of shame.
Many different methods have been used to study shame’s appeasement function,
including correlational designs (Masters, 1988), still-faced photographs of individuals
showing shame and other emotional expressions (Keltner et al., 1997), or using a long
series of vignettes describing someone committing violations that could elicit shame
and/or guilt (e.g., Ferguson and colleagues’ 2007 above-reviewed studies of outsiders’
impressions of actors based on their guilt and shame expressions and experiences; Semin
& Papadopoulou, 1990). Other more dynamic methods include using video tapes of
individuals showing shame or embarrassment (Savitsky & Sim, 1974; Semin &
Manstead, 1982) and mock jury contexts (Keltner et al., 1997; Lazowski, 1988; Tsoudis
& Smith-Lovin, 1998). Unfortunately, no studies have been conducted to directly assess
the appeasement functions that shame serves through its reliably identifiable expression
during an actual interpersonal interaction. For example, Keltner and colleagues’ (1998)
teasing study was behavioral in nature, but the fraternity members and romantic couples
were told to tease one another, and knew their reactions were being viewed. Moreover, it
was not clear that the “submissive displays” the individuals portrayed after teasing
represented distinct shame reactions. Edelmann’s (1982) previously described study also
could be considered behavioral in nature, but the accomplice’s emotional display meant
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to express embarrassment, because the accomplice exhibited laughter. Finally, variations
of the mock jury paradigm using videotapes (Savitsky & Sim) could also be considered
behavioral, but participants were aware they were participating in a study and thus knew
their decisions would not actually affect the defendant.
Other behavioral studies have also been conducted to study the nature of shame
and guilt, although they did not focus on the appeasement function these emotions serve.
In these studies, which generally involved children, shame was associated with
maladaptive outcomes, while the opposite was found regarding guilt (Barrett, ZahnWaxler, & Cole, 1993; Kochanska, Gross, Lin, & Nichols, 2002; Lewis, 2000). For
example, Barrett and colleagues used a broken doll paradigm to examine children’s
shame-prone or guilt-prone behavior. The operationalizations of shame and guilt in these
behavioral studies are similar to those employed in the TOSCA. Specifically, avoidant
behaviors (e.g., hiding the broken doll or avoiding eye contact with experimenter whose
doll the child broke) represented operationalizations of shame, whereas approach
behaviors (e.g., trying to fix the doll or asking the experimenter for help) were classified
as guilt responses. As Ortony, Clore, and Collins (1988), Tomkins (1963), and Lewis
(1979) emphasized, one cannot equate particular voluntary behaviors with more
automatically evoked states, like emotional experiences. Just as hitting another does not
necessarily or only represent anger, it is difficult to know with certainty whether the
avoidant behaviors uniquely or only involved feelings of shame; they also could include
fear, anxiety, or just sudden arousal. The same criticism exists regarding behaviors
classified as guilt; for example, those approaching the experimenter may be feeling
anxious and afraid, but they also may be more tolerant of arousal.
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Why is it so important to conduct a realistic, behaviorally based study? Tomkins
(1964) stated that using the still photograph as a stimulus to convey affect is suboptimal.
He contends that not only is it difficult to accurately pose each affect in a photograph, but
that using still photographs “congeals” the motion of an affective response into an
expression that does not exactly capture the intended affect. As he stated,
The facial affective response is a set (emphasis in original) of responses
over time. The smile is a set of widening mouths. The eye blink in
surprise or startle is a set of narrowing of the eyelids. […] The look of
shame is a set of eyelid and head lowerings. (Tomkins, p. 225)
Emotional expression is inherently dynamic; a still photograph is inadequate in capturing
and displaying the dynamics of a facial display.
Another argument for conducting a behaviorally based study of the effects of the
shame expression in an interpersonal encounter is that shame functions in an
interpersonal context (Barrett, 1995; Cooley, 1964; Gilbert, 2007; Scheff, 1988). Just as
the conclusions biologists can draw from studying birds or apes in a laboratory are
limited, so, too, are conclusions that social scientists can draw regarding the functions of
shame by using paper-and-pencil or simulation methods. Because shame assists
individuals with repairing social relationships, we must conduct behaviorally based
studies of shame when actual interpersonal encounters between individuals are
unfolding. It is not a far stretch to conclude that current methods used to assess
appeasement (i.e., videotapes, mock juries) lack ecological validity and are not accurately
capturing the functions of shame. For example, Semin and Manstead (1982) asked
participants to view a videotape of a transgressor showing shame. This method may be
accurately assessing how participants rate the transgressor’s expression of appeasement,
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but does not capture the dynamics between the transgressor and the individual actually
impacted by the transgression. The same logic applies to using a mock trial; the
participants are not personally involved with the defendant and are neither positively nor
negatively impacted by the results. Thus, the mock jury paradigm used to assess shame
is not a complete representation of how shame functions in real, interpersonal encounters.
Shame functions to reduce aggression in others that have been or could be negatively
impacted by another individual’s actions, or it limits damage in terms of others’
evaluations of oneself during interpersonal encounters.
Notably, there are counter-arguments against the use of behaviorally based
methods; this counter-evidence stems not only from research involving adults, but also
from research including very young children. In particular, Harris (1991) reviewed an
extensive body of literature demonstrating that hypothetically presented information, in
the form of vignettes constructed for a particular study or segments selected from
fictional novels, equally greatly involve participants, produce similar profiles of
physiological arousal, result in specific patterns of brain activation in areas specializing
in emotions (e.g., the amygdala), and reveal results similar to those found in studies using
in vivo presentations. Importantly, several of the studies supporting Harris’s argument
actually were studying emotions, such as guilt or pity. Harris argues that our
considerable capacity for imagination, and to learn from “as if” events, is an adaptive
trait that evolved in humans, because it spared them the drastic or dire consequences of
being able to learn only from our actual mistakes.
Although Harris’s (1991) arguments are well conceived, and deserve serious
consideration, evidence since the time of his suggestions has rapidly accumulated
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supporting this author’s concerns regarding exclusive reliance on hypothetical vignettes
(Clore & Huntsinger, 2007). Information is processed differently, and results in different
outcomes, as a function of whether activation is limited only to the frontal cortices (a
greater possibility when hypothetical vignettes are used), or also involves emotional
“centers” of the brain (which seems likelier when perceivers’ welfare actually depends
on the agents’ behaviors and emotional reactions). Moreover, ample research within
experimental social psychology has shown discrepant findings depending upon whether
participants are actively involved or are mere observers of depicted situations. Perceivers
estimate a markedly different pattern of results regarding, for example, Milgram’s (1965)
classic studies of obedience to authority, or Asch’s (1955) equally classic investigations
of conformity, as a function of whether they passively receive information about these
set-ups or are actively involved as participants (Sabini et al., 2001).
From the above discussion, it is clear that several methods have been used to
study the appeasement functions of shame and to compare the antecedents or
consequences of guilt with shame. More importantly, because using still photographs,
videotapes, and mock trials are limited in the information they can provide, and in their
ability to portray the appropriate interpersonal context, a behavioral study that examines
the interpersonal and social nature of shame should more accurately capture the adaptive
functions of shame and address weaknesses of previous studies.

Crosscultural Differences for Shame and Guilt

Although various methods have been used to investigate shame’s appeasement
mechanisms, the question still exists of whether these results generalize to other cultures
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across the world. Most psychological research specifically contrasting guilt with shame
has focused on Americans (Mascolo & Fischer, 2006). This, of course, raises important
considerations regarding the extent to which culture, broadly defined, influences the
functionality of any emotion. Crosscultural studies of the evaluation of shame and guilt
have, moreover, focused largely on individualism-collectivism, which is only one of
several dimensions distinguishing different cultures (Wallbott & Scherer, 1995). The
primary goals of Americans are taking care of the self and one’s immediate family,
which is a central facet of individualism in the U.S. and countries such as Australia,
France, Italy, and the Netherlands. Reflecting, in part, their individualism and beliefs in
choice or self-determination, guilt as construed in the largely American literature seems
to connote its citizens’ great optimism regarding their ability to change or improve;
interestingly, at least in this culture, guilt typically is experienced as short-lived and low
to moderate in intensity (e.g., Walbott & Scherer). In contrast, American society seems
to harbor extremely negative attitudes towards shame (e.g., Scheff, 1988). For many
Americans, shame is a tortuous experience of defeat and dishonor (Cohen, Vandello, &
Rantilla, 1998), and is even considered taboo (Scheff, 2003). American individuals’
loathing of shameful experiences, their shame of shame, and the society’s tendency to ill
prepare individuals in shame’s regulation might even be one of multiple contributors to
violence, such as violence in parent-child and intimate relationships, or even schoolrelated shootings (although shame as a precursor to violence certainly is not restricted to
American culture).
In contrast to individualistic cultures, collectivistic societies are interdependent
and look after larger units in the community in exchange for loyalty. Collectivistic
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attitudes are prevalent in countries representing the Middle or Far East as well as Brazil,
Chile, China, the Dominican Republic, Greece, Hong Kong, Mexico, and Puerto Rico.
By far the most research has focused on collectivism in the Middle and Far East, as well
as in Hispanic cultures. In these cultures, shame is a valued feeling and shaming is a
frequent practice of parents (e.g., Kitayama, Markus, & Matsumoto, 1995). Individuals
in collectivistic cultures appear more integrated or motivated by shame because of their
stronger interdependence, and greater desires for unity and belongingness, which
contrasts greatly with Americans’ zeal for greater individuality and personal autonomy.
Nonetheless, it is untrue that collectivistic cultures value shame to the exclusion
of guilt. Respondents from collectivistic cultures systematically acknowledge guilt as
important. Lebra (1983) described Japanese individuals’ strong inclinations to feel guilty
regarding the plight of others. They report guilt because of a strong identification with or
obligation to the group’s welfare, and will even report guilt when not responsible for
another’s suffering. The Chinese also exhibit a strong social orientation in which the
sense of self is firmly rooted in the group’s welfare. As such, Stipek (1998) reported that
Chinese participants felt much guiltier (and ashamed) than did Americans about someone
else’s untoward behavior (cheating by their brothers). Compared to individualistic
societies, they rate guilt to last longer, involve greater degrees of immorality, and to
evoke greater symptoms (such as stomach troubles or crying/sobbing; Wallbott &
Scherer, 1995).
This brief overview of crosscultural differences in the significance of shame and
guilt risks stereotyping cultures in much the same way that American researchers have
compartmentalized or contrasted the functions of these two emotions. It nonetheless

66
serves the purpose of identifying wide-reaching societal contributions to the ways in
which various scientists construe guilt and shame. In largely western or individualistic
samples, guilt may receive greater moral credit, because of the very way in which
researchers typically operationalize guilt (as approach/repair or indications of
internal/controllable attributions) in response to a transgression. Similarly, shame may
be viewed as more painful or negative because of its more typical westernized
operationalization (as self-criticism/avoidance or evidence of internal/uncontrollable
attributions). These typical Americanized conceptualizations should thus be given
attention, as they may not accurately capture shame and guilt worldwide, and may even
lead to inaccurate conclusions regarding these emotions.
Along with many investigations focusing on the crosscultural similarities and
differences of shame and guilt, many studies have similarly examined shame and guilt in
a variety of domains. Specifically, previous research has been conducted on shame
functioning in an achievement context (Kelly, Brownell, & Campbell, 2000; Stipek,
1995; Thompson, Altman, & Davidson, 2002). For example, Stipek found that childrens’
emotional reactions (e.g., experiencing shame, guilt, or pride) to their successes and
failures in an achievement situation were a function of the parents’ expression of
approval or disapproval for the child’s performance. Similarly, Kelly and colleagues
found that children’s shame responses at 3 years old could be predicted by the mother’s
negative evaluation of their poor performance in a difficult task at 24 months.
Related to the empirical evidence showing that shame functions in an
achievement context and supporting the idea that shame can be elicited in a variety of
situations are the domains of shame that have been proposed by Nathanson (1992) and
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Greenwald and Harder (1998). Along with stating that shame is associated with domains
termed “sense of self,” “personal attractiveness,” and “sexuality,” two of Nathanson’s
(1992) domains are highly related to an achievement situation, and are: “matters of
personal size, strength, ability and skill,” and “competition” (1992, p. 317). Similarly,
Greenwald and Harder asserted there are four types of shame experiences, including
conformity, prosocial behavior, sex, and status/competition. The domain most highly
related to an achievement situation is the status/competition domain of shame, where the
authors stated that individuals may have a “heightened concern with the avoidance of
shame from low status and the achievement of ambitious goals.” (Greenwald & Harder,
p. 235). Futhermore, they asserted that individuals who do not make such efforts to gain
status or achieve may have a great sense of shame (Greenwald & Harder). Along the
same lines, Keltner and Buswell (1996) found that common elicitors of shame shared the
core feature of suffering from an impaired social self and lowered status, and
importantly, one common antecedent of shame was poor performance. Although
domains of guilt have not been proposed, Weiner (1985) contended that guilt can be
elicited when an outcome is attributed to internal, unstable, controllable characteristics,
specifically in situations such as low effort leading to test failure, rather than low ability.

Summary and Current Study

In order to lay the foundation for the current study, a brief summary of the abovereviewed literature will be provided. Although many definitions and distinctions have
been proposed to distinguish between shame and guilt (e.g., moral/nonmoral,
public/private), little evidence has been found to support the assumption that they are two

68
completely discrete emotions that serve different functions (Tangney & Dearing, 2002).
Instead of attempting to distinguish between these two states, the position taken in the
current study is that shame and guilt serve similar functions, and are in fact both adaptive
self-conscious or social emotions linked to creating positive impressions in “the minds of
the other” (Barrett, 1995; Cooley, 1964; Gilbert, 2007; Scheff, 1988).
Problematic to recent attempts to study shame and guilt is that the “goldstandard” instrument used to assess these emotions, the TOSCA (Tangney et al., 1989),
may be leading emotion researchers astray. To elaborate, many researchers using the
TOSCA have concluded that shame is the maladaptive, “dark” immoral emotion, while
guilt is the adaptive response for repairing damage done to interpersonal relationships
(see Tangney & Dearing, 2002 for a review). However, criticisms about how shame and
guilt are defined and operationalized in the TOSCA, as well as how the results from the
TOSCA are statistically analyzed were explored. Importantly, many researchers
criticizing the TOSCA have speculated that shame’s many maladaptive correlates are not
due to shame’s maladaptive nature, but instead result from the TOSCA’s flaws (Elison,
2002, 2003a; Ferguson & Stegge, 1998; Ferguson et al., 2007; Luyten et al., 2002; Sabini
& Silver, 1997).
Although much research conducted to determine the nature of shame and guilt has
concluded that shame is maladaptive and guilt adaptive, the above review explored an
evolutionary view of these two states that instead presumes that both emotions evolved to
assist individuals with successfully navigating the social environment in which they live.
By considering shame through the “social self-preservation theory” (Gruenwald et al.,
2007), the idea of “social attraction holding power” (Gilbert, 1997; Gilbert & McGuire,
1998), and shame as an appeasement mechanism (Keltner & Harker, 1998; Scheff, 1988),
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much evidence is provided to support the view that shame, just like every other emotion,
is adaptive at appropriate levels. Evidence for how shame serves these adaptive
functions, through its unique bodily expression, was also reviewed (Darwin, 1872;
Gilbert & McGuire, 1998; Izard, 1977; Keltner, 1995; Tomkins, 1963, 1987). Although
evidence for shame functioning as an appeasement mechanism was provided and
supports an evolutionary view of shame (Keltner et al., 1997; Lazowski, 1988; Masters,
1988; Savitsky & Sim, 1974; Semin & Manstead, 1982; Tsoudis & Smith-Lovin, 1998),
this previous research was found to be lacking in many important ways (e.g., use of
written scenarios, lack of ecological validity, problems with the use of still photographs
rather than dynamic emotional displays).
It is clear that the conclusions made by those researchers using the TOSCA
directly contradict the evolutionary literature. Researchers using the TOSCA have
concluded that shame is a maladaptive, self-focused, harmful emotion (Tangney &
Dearing, 2002), while the opposite has been found for guilt (Tangney & Dearing, 2002).
Moreover, evolutionary based researchers have asserted the opposite view, namely that
shame serves as a warning signal and functions to appease another after a transgression
(Gilbert & McGuire, 1998; Keltner & Harker, 1998). Thus, the primary purpose of the
present study will be to explore whether shame really does serve the appeasement
functions proposed. Furthermore, although many researchers (Keltner et al., 1997;
Lazowski, 1988; Masters, 1988; Savitsky & Sim, 1974; Semin & Manstead, 1982;
Tsoudis & Smith-Lovin, 1998) have examined the beneficial effects of shame with the
use of various methodologies, no researchers beyond Ferguson and colleagues (2007) has
specifically contrasted the functions of guilt and shame. Thus, as a secondary purpose,
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the current study will also compare whether shame and guilt differ in their appeasement
value.
As was previously stated, the conclusions made regarding shame as a maladaptive
emotion could exist because of biases in how shame and guilt are defined,
operationalized, and measured by the TOSCA. To address this problematic issue, the
current study will instead operationalize shame from an evolutionary perspective. More
specifically, and as was addressed above, much evidence exists to support the assumption
that shame is reliably recognized and more effectively communicated through its unique
nonverbal display. Thus, in the current study, shame will be operationalized as a
facial/bodily display of shame (e.g., head down, gaze averted), rather than a priori as a
maladaptive state as operationalized in the TOSCA. In addition, because no unique
nonverbal display, vocalic, or physiological pattern has been reliably identified for guilt,
guilt will be operationalized as an attempt to apologize and make reparations. The
general consensus in the literature is that, when experiencing guilt, individuals focus on
their bad behavior, take responsibility for their behavior, and are motivated to make
amends, via, for example, verbalizations of apology (Barrett, 1995; Barrett & Campos,
1987; Gilbert, 1997; Tangney & Dearing, 2002).
The current study will improve on prior research beyond operationalizations. As
was mentioned above, previous studies conducted on the appeasement functions shame
serves do not completely capture the entire picture of shame as an appeasement
mechanism. In this paper, the position taken is that shame and guilt are social emotions
that function in an interpersonal context, which evolved to warn individuals that we may
not be creating positive impressions in “the minds of the other” (Barrett, 1995; Cooley,
1964; Gilbert, 2007; Scheff, 1988). Shame functions to restore personal relationships,
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thus it is essential to measure the appeasement functions shame serves using a realistic,
behaviorally based study that explores shame functioning to reduce damage in an actual
interpersonal context. Moreover, as was explored above, shame and guilt are not only
elicited after a moral violation or transgression. Because evidence exists to support the
claim that shame also frequently occurs in achievement/ competition situations, in the
current study, shame and guilt will be investigated in the context of a job interview.
Specifically, an achievement paradigm adapted from Pedersen and colleagues (2006) will
be used, which falls squarely in the domains of competition and matters of ability and
skill.
If evolutionary based assumptions regarding shame are correct, an expression of
shame will have a positive effect on other individuals’ reactions to the mistakes of the job
candidate above and beyond any verbalization of guilt. Moreover, if it is found that
shame does indeed serve the predicted appeasement functions, the current study will not
only provide evidence to support the conclusion that shame does indeed serve adaptive
functions, but also provide support for the argument that previous conclusions drawn
regarding shame are misleading and result from biases in the TOSCA. In addition, as
previously discussed, misleading conclusions stem from the overgeneralization of results
based on shame measured as a trait (e.g., TOSCA, shame-proneness) to shame’s qualities
as a state. In contrast, the current study will manipulate shame as a state to investigate its
adaptive functions, as a state. Thus, the general hypothesis is that after the job candidate
makes multiple mistakes interviewing for a job, participants evaluating the job candidate
will rate the candidate more favorably if the candidate shows a shame expression, rather
than if the candidate just expresses guilt in the form of apologies.
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CHAPTER III
METHODS

Design

Participants were randomly assigned to one of five conditions, which were a
control condition (mistake-free) and four experimental conditions (mistakes made)
representing a 2 X 2 factorial design, 2 (no-shame, high-shame) X 2 (no-guilt, highguilt). In the high-shame/high-guilt condition, the candidate showed an accepted
bodily/facial display of shame (e.g., head down, brief gaze aversion), as well as a verbal
guilt response (e.g., apologies). In the high-shame/no-guilt condition, the candidate
showed the same bodily/facial display of shame, with no verbal guilt response. In the noshame/high-guilt condition, the candidate showed no bodily/facial display of shame, but
did verbalize guilt in the same form as in the high-shame/high-guilt condition. Finally, in
the no-shame/no-guilt condition, neither a display of shame or verbalization of guilt was
displayed by the candidate.

Procedure

The following procedure was adapted from the Pedersen and colleague’s
paradigm (study number 1, 2006). Participants were led to believe they were
participating in a study investigating the association between personality and intelligence,
and importantly, were assisting the faculty in the psychology department at Utah State
University with evaluating candidates applying for a coveted research assistantship in the
department (see Appendix B). Upon arrival at the designated testing room, participants
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were greeted by the author posing as the experimenter. The experimenter informed
participants of the tasks they would be completing, and obtained their informed consent
(see Appendix F). Each participant, tested individually during a 1-hour session, was then
seated in front of a television monitor, webcam, and microphone. Each participant
viewed one of five recordings of the same actress enacting a script as an applicant for the
research position (see Appendix C). Participants were led to believe that the candidate
was a real person, interviewing for the research position live via a webcam, and that the
candidate was administering the tests for the applied or “performance” portion of the
interview. They were further told they would be evaluating how well the candidate
performed after the testing session was completed. To maintain the deception,
participants were told their microphone was not working, thus discouraging attempts to
communicate with the candidate.
Participants completed one personality test and three intelligence tests during the
testing session (see Appendix D). While the candidate was administering these tests, she
made three mistakes (i.e., misreading instructions, reading the incorrect list of words, and
reading the incorrect options for a multiple-choice question), thereby becoming a
transgressor who undermined participants’ performance. Whether and which type of
emotion(s) the candidate displayed after each mistake varied across the five recordings,
with each display representing one of the experiment’s five conditions. To reinforce the
manipulation, the candidate also gave a closing statement at the end of the interview
thanking the participants for their time, and once again showing a response consistent
with the 2 X 2 design. Because no mistakes were made in the control condition, neither
shame nor guilt was displayed in this condition, but instead the candidate remained
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emotionally neutral throughout the testing period. Once testing was completed, and
regardless of how the participant truly had performed, the live experimenter reentered the
room, gathered the testing materials to determine an overall “preliminary” score for the
participant, and then told each participant their performance was at the average level.
After each participant was given feedback regarding their performance, the live
experimenter administered a questionnaire containing the dependent measures. Finally,
each participant was debriefed using the same series of questions in a planned order to
assess if they were truly deceived (see Appendix E).

Measure

To determine whether displaying shame and/or guilt after multiple mistakes
affected how favorably participants viewed the candidate, the participants completed a
12-item “candidate evaluation” form, from which scores for the primary dependent
measure were derived (see Appendix B). Four of the items were filler items, and were
not analyzed because they were created with the intention of disguising the true purpose
of the study from participants. An example of a filler item would be, “I feel this person
is helpful.” The dependent measure consisted of eight items inquiring about various
work and personality-related attributes of the candidate. Participants were asked to rate
each item using a 1 to 5 Likert scale, with 5 anchored strongly agree and 1 anchored
strongly disagree. No items were reversed-scored. The eight items were selected to
represent attributes important in hiring/evaluation decisions. Because some of these
items could easily be characterized as an important personality-related attribute, as well
as a work-related attribute, the dependent measure was not designed to represent two
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distinct subscales. Examples of the work and personality-related items are: “I would hire
this person for the position,” “I feel this person would be effective at performing their
job,” “I found this person to be likable,” or “I feel this person is sincere.” Participants’
scores on the eight nonfiller items were then summed to create an overall candidate
evaluation score.

Population and Sample

In the current study, participants were recruited from three introductory
psychology classes and two abnormal psychology classes at Utah State University. A
power analysis revealed that to attain an effect size of 1.25 and a power of 1.0, 20
participants were needed in each condition. To be conservative, data were collected from
110 college students, with 22 students in each condition (7 males, 15 females)1. This 7 to
15 male-to-female ratio is representative of the college from which the participants were
sampled. Participants ranged in age from 18 to 51 (M age = 21.1) and 68% were female.
The majority of the participants were freshmen (40.9% freshmen, 27.3% sophomore,
20.9% junior, 10% senior, and 0.9% indicating they were transfer students), 93.6%
Caucasians, and 89.1% reported The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints as their
religious affiliation. The greatest percentage, 18.2%, identified themselves as
“undecided” in their academic major, and no academic major dominated the sample.
Twenty-three majors were also endorsed, with the three most common being: 12.7%
psychology, 10.9% nursing, and 10% business. Each student was randomly assigned to
one of five conditions: high-shame/high-guilt, high-shame/no-guilt, no-shame/high-guilt,
no-shame/no-guilt, and a control condition (mistake-free). Extra credit was given to each
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student for their participation, and no student refused to participate once testing had
begun.
Below are the predictions made regarding participants’ ratings of the candidate
throughout the five study conditions. Figure 1, follows depicting the predicted means
plot based on the hypotheses.

Hypotheses

The specific hypotheses to be examined are:
1. In the 2 X 2 (Shame X Guilt) design, there will be a main effect for shame.
The candidate will be rated most favorably in the high-shame/high-guilt and highshame/no-guilt conditions in comparison to the no-shame/high-guilt and no-shame/noguilt conditions.
2. In the same 2 X 2 (shame X guilt) design, there will be a shame X guilt
interaction of the fan-like form displayed in Figure 1. Testing this interaction involves
several subcomparisons or subhypotheses:
2a. Ratings of the candidate in the high-shame/high-guilt and high-shame/no-guilt
conditions will not be significantly different, indicating that verbalizations of guilt do not
add to positive impressions of the candidate above those formed based on bodily/facial
displays of shame.
2b. The candidate should be rated more favorably in the no-shame/high-guilt
condition only when compared to the no-shame/no-guilt condition.
3. Ratings of the candidate in the high-shame/no-guilt condition will be
significantly more favorable than in the no-shame/high-guilt condition.
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4. Ratings of the candidate in the control condition would be the most favorable,
and would be used as a point of comparison for the experimental conditions. Ratings in
the control condition would be significantly more favorable than ratings in the noshame/no-guilt condition, and candidate ratings in the high-shame/high-guilt and highshame/no-guilt will be comparably favorable to those offered in the control condition, as
indicated by low magnitude effect sizes.

Favorable

Candidate
Evaluation
Scores

High-Guilt =
No-Guilt =
Control =

Unfavorable

No

Figure 1. Hypothesized plot of means.

Shame

High
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CHAPTER IV
RESULTS

Reliability and Component Analysis
of the Dependent Measure

Eight items in the candidate evaluation form were meant to assess how favorably
participants evaluated the candidate in terms of various personality and work-related
characteristics important in hiring decisions. In addition, the form included four filler
items (items 1, 10, 11, and 12), that were not to be used in the statistical tests of the
hypotheses. As a first step in evaluating the structure and reliability of this measure, an
initial principal components analysis using SPSS (with Promax Rotation2) was conducted
on the eight target items. Two components with eigenvalues greater than one were
found, but the scree plot and minimum average partial criteria suggested retention of only
one component (minimum average partial; MAP; O’Conner, 2000). Therefore, a
composite evaluation score was calculated for each participant by summing the scores
across the eight items and dividing by the total number of items.
To further examine whether the two-component solution was more appropriate,
subscale total scores were computed and reliability analyses were conducted. Cronbach’s
alpha coefficients were 0.75 and 0.76 for the first and second components, respectively.
The correlation between the total scores for these subscales was nevertheless high (r =
0.61, p < .001; corrected for attenuation = 0.81). These are consistent with results of the
principal components analysis, which the two components were correlated at 0.52. The
eigenvalue for the second component was close to 1 (1.05), moreover, indicating the
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second component explained little variance above the first component. These results
converge on the decision to consider the eight target items as a measure of one latent
construct. In fact, when so treated, Cronbach’s alpha increased to 0.83. Inspection of the
item-total correlations for the eight-item scale revealed 0.47 to be the smallest item-total
correlation; importantly, removing this or any other item would have decreased the
scales’ alpha coefficient.
These scale analyses suggest that a one-construct model best fits the data.
Consistent with this interpretation, analyses (i.e., ANOVAs) conducted revealed no
substantive differences in results when analyses were conducted separately for the four
personality and four work items. Therefore, all analyses reported below were conducted
on the dependent measure operationalized as the sum of participants’ scores on the four
work-related and four personality-related items.

Manipulation Check

Before specific hypotheses will be addressed, it is important to determine whether
or not the adapted Bushman paradigm (Pedersen et al., 2006) did, indeed, negatively
impact the evaluations of the candidate. Had this not been the case, there would be no
negative effect for shame and/or guilt to mitigate. Thus, an essential first step is to
address whether participants’ ratings of the candidate in the no-shame/no-guilt condition
(in which mistakes were made but neither shame nor guilt were shown) were rated
significantly more negatively than those in the control condition (in which no mistakes
were made), therefore determining if the manipulation of inducing negative evaluations
occurred and created something to be mitigated by the independent variables (e.g., shame
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and guilt). An independent samples t test demonstrated that this assumption was
supported, as the mean for the no-shame/no-guilt group (M = 27.50, SD = 4.42) was
significantly lower than the control condition (M = 33.41, SD = 2.86), t = 5.27, p < .001,
Cohen’s d = 1.59. Thus, in a sense, the no-shame/no-guilt group acts as a baseline
against which the existence of mitigating effects can be evaluated.

Two-Way ANOVA and Condition Comparisons

A 2 X 2 ANOVA was conducted to evaluate the effects of a shame expression
(no, high) and verbalization of guilt (no, high) on participants’ ratings of the candidate.
Levene’s test for homogeneity of variance was not significant, p > .05, and thus reliance
on the two-way ANOVA results is appropriate. No significant gender differences were
found for the following main effects, interaction, or independent samples t tests, thus all
following results are based on the entire sample. As can be seen in Table 1, and
supporting Hypothesis 1, the ANOVA results indicated a significant main effect for
shame. In comparison, the main effect for guilt was not statistically significant, nor was
the shame-by-guilt interaction, failing to support Hypothesis 2. Figure 2 plots the means
for the four shame-by-guilt conditions and control condition, depicting the main effects
and interaction.
The mean composite score and standard deviations for participants’ ratings of the
candidate for each experimental condition as a function of the two factors are presented
in Table 2. Comparing the subscripts associated with the mean values reported in Table
2 indicate which differences are statistically significantly. As can be seen in Table 2, the
mean rating of the candidate for the control condition was the most favorable, with the
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Table 1
Coefficients for the Main Effects and Interaction for Shame and Guilt
Source of
variation

Sums of
squares

df

Mean
square

F

p

Partial ç 2

Shame
Guilt
Shame x Guilt
Error

324.56
23.01
21.01
1248.86

1
1
1
84

324.56
23.01
21.01
14.87

21.83
1.55
1.41
--

<.001
n.s.
n.s.
--

0.206
0.018
0.017
–

Note. Type III sumes of squares used in calculation.

34.0
33.0
32.0
Candidate
Evaluation
Scores

31.0
High-Guilt =
No-Guilt =
Control =

30.0
29.0
28.0
27.0

No

High
Shame

Figure 2. Plot of means.
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Table 2
Descriptive Statistics for Candidate Evaluation Form Ratings for Each
Experimental Condition
Condition

Shame

Guilt

M

–

–

4.18ab

0.36

High
High

High
No

4.05ab
4.04b

0.45
0.50

No
No

High
No

3.69c
3.44c

0.41
0.55

Control

SD

Note. N = 22 for each condition. Scale anchors were: 1 = strongly
disagree to 5 = strongly agree. Cells sharing common subscripts do not
differ significantly (p < .01).

average rating for the eight items being slightly above a rating of agree, which represents
a rating of 4 on a 5-point Likert scale. This mean rating is not statistically significantly
different from either high-shame conditions, as the mean rating for each item for the
high-shame/high-guilt and high-shame/no-guilt conditions approximated a rating of
agree. In comparison to both high-shame conditions, the mean ratings for each item in
both no-shame conditions was less favorable (between a rating of agree and neutral).
These ratings of the candidate initially support the hypothesis that the candidate would be
rated more favorably when showing expressions of shame, in comparison to
communications of guilt in the form of apologies.
Independent samples t tests were employed to determine in which condition
participants rated the candidate more favorably. Select groups were compared based on a
priori hypotheses about expected differences between groups. The results of these
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planned comparisons using a Bonferroni correction are presented below in Table 3. As
predicted in Hypothesis 2a, when looking at the comparison between high-shame/highguilt and high-shame/no-guilt, the mean difference in ratings between groups is not
significant, indicating that verbalizations of guilt did not increase the ratings of the
candidate above the effect of expressions of shame. Similarly, when analyzing the mean
difference between the no-shame/high-guilt and no-shame/no-guilt as stated in
Hypothesis 2b, the difference is also not significant, indicating that ratings of the
candidate did not significantly increase when verbalizations of guilt were provided
compared to no verbalizations of guilt. Conversely, and supporting the prediction made
in Hypothesis 3, when examining the comparison between high-shame/no-guilt and noshame/high-guilt, which is the most pure comparison of the effect of shame and guilt on
participants’ ratings, the mean difference between groups is statistically significant. This
result indicates that participants rated the candidate significantly more favorably when
she only expressed shame compared to only verbalizing guilt. Finally, as a test of
Hypothesis 4, the mean difference between the control group and high-shame/high-guilt
and high-shame/no-guilt was not significant. This contrast involves a shift in baseline;
rather than comparing to other conditions where mistakes were made, these comparisons
are to the no-mistake condition. This result is interesting because participants did not
rate the candidate more favorably when no mistakes were made compared to when three
mistakes were made throughout the testing period.
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Table 3
Planned Comparisons Between Conditions

Comparison

HS-HG by HS-NG
HS-NG by NS-HG
NS-HG by NS-NG
HS-HG by Control
HS-NG by Control

Mean
difference

0.04
2.82
2.00
1.05
1.09

t

0.04
2.56
1.72
1.06
1.04

df

42
42
42
42
42

p

0.97
0.01
0.09
0.26
0.31

95% C.I.

-2.29 to 2.38
0.59 to 5.04
-4.36 to 0.36
-0.94 to 3.03
-1.03 to 3.22

Cohen’s d

0.01
0.78
0.53
0.33
0.32

Note. HS-HG = high-shame/high-guilt; HS-NG = high-shame/no-guilt; NS-HG = noshame/high-suilt; NS-NG = no-shame/no-guilt.
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CHAPTER V
DISCUSSION

Throughout the psychological literature on emotion, a view that has become ever
more prevalent is the assertion that emotions evolved and are adaptive because they assist
individuals with successfully navigating the social and physical environments in which
they live (Ekman, 1992; Keltner & Gross, 1999). Specifically, shame has been
hypothesized to function in an interpersonal context where it serves as a warning system
that our behavior or personal attributes may not be creating a positive impression in “the
minds of the other” (Barrett, 1995; Cooley, 1964; Gilbert, 2007; Scheff, 1988).
Similarly, guilt also has been hypothesized to serve adaptive functions, in the form of
relationship maintenance, strengthening social bonds, and restoring equity in a
relationship (Barrett; Baumeister et al., 1994; Tangney & Dearing, 2002). Importantly,
both emotions have also been associated with negative outcomes as well: both shame and
guilt have been found to be positively correlated with depression, somatization, hostility,
anger, and psychoticism (Harder, 1995; Tangney & Dearing). Thus, it is unlikely that
either is always adaptive or maladaptive. Part of this inconsistency could be because of
biases in the operationalizations of shame and guilt in the predominantly used measure to
assess these emotions, the TOSCA. Therefore, in the current study, operationalizations
consistent with an evolutionary view of these emotions were used (e.g., unique nonverbal
display of shame, verbalizations of guilt) to shed light on both emotions’ appeasement
functions after a transgression. The results of the current directly contradict the

86
widespread notion in the psychological literature that experiencing shame is maladaptive,
whereas guilt is adaptive (Tangney & Dearing).
In the following section, the results of the present study will be discussed and
evaluated in terms of how they compare to and extend findings from earlier research
regarding appeasement, as well as their consistency with an evolutionary view of shame.
In addition, implications for the measurement of shame and guilt will be presented; it will
be argued that the currently dominant paradigm used to measure shame is not adequately
assessing its appeasement function. This, in turn, casts doubt on the TOSCA being the
“gold standard” for measuring shame. Finally, limitations and future research directions
will be discussed.

Summary and Importance of Present Findings

Throughout the evolutionary psychology literature, multiple paradigms (e.g.,
social self-preservation, damage limitation, and appeasement; Gilbert, 1997; Gruenwald
et al., 2007; Keltner & Harker, 1998) have been developed and converge on the assertion
that shame serves adaptive functions. Similar to all these frameworks is the assumption
that shame is an adaptive experience and display, because it signals to the people who are
feeling ashamed that their behavior or appearance may not be eliciting positive responses
from other members of their social group. Displays of shame also purportedly
communicate to the group a transgressors’ “submissive” (as opposed to “dominant” or
“assertive”) stance. These displays of submission might then weaken aggression or
counter-attack from others in the social group, and have been seen in both human and
nonhuman animals (de Waal, 1988).
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In addition to readily inhibiting negative counter-reactions, a submissive shame
display communicates the perpetrators’ evaluations of their own behavior and future
behaviors. Long before shame or submissiveness were framed in evolutionary terms,
sociologists recognized shame’s communicative value. Certain sociologists (e.g., Heise,
1979) conceptualized all emotions, and others (e.g., Scheff, 1988) specifically analyzed
shame or submission, as salient internal feedback mechanisms and as external indicators
to others of the self’s approval or disapproval of different behaviors. Because
transgressors’ expressions of shame express recognition of their own failings and their
negative impact on others, submissive displays such as shame essentially serve as an
appeasement mechanism to restore social harmony after a transgression.
Importantly, little empirical research has been conducted investigating shame’s
(or guilt’s) beneficial effects on the self and others in the social group. Moreover, as was
reviewed above, those studies that have been conducted were found to be limited in their
ability to better illuminate shame’s adaptive functions. For example, many of these
studies involved hypothetical incidents, in which neither the perpetrators nor the
audience actually interacted. Furthermore, almost all of these studies examined only
whether shame’s presence or absence impacted others’ evaluations of the perpetrators,
thereby ignoring the relative influence of shame and guilt on others. The studies that
most closely resemble the study conducted for this thesis are those of Ferguson and her
associates (Ferguson et al., 2007). These studies represented important investigations of
the benefits of shame and/or guilt across a wide variety of conditions and using multiple
operationalizations of the two states. Yet these studies, like those mentioned above, also
involved hypothetical or analogue situations. Although Harris (1991) argued and
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presented evidence of the similarity in evidence found when using hypothetical or “reallife” situations even in research focusing on highly charged emotional events, evidence is
rapidly accumulating to cast doubt on the necessary equivalence of findings based on
hypothetical rather than actual involvement (Clore & Huntsinger, 2007).
Thus, in the current study, participants actively “interacted” with a female
individual they believed was interviewing for a coveted researcher position. On several
occasions throughout the interaction, the candidate made mistakes when administering
test items or instructions; this, in turn, directly and negatively undermined the
participants’ performance. After each mistake, the job candidate expressed shame and
guilt according to the 2 X 2 design: two shame conditions (high shame, no shame) by two
guilt conditions (high guilt, no guilt). A control condition was also used to measure
participants’ ratings of the candidate when making no mistakes at all. The dependent
measure was the Candidate Evaluation Form, which asked participants to rate the
candidate on eight relevant judgments (e.g., likable, happy working with this person).
The logic behind the design is that the candidate’s mistakes represent transgressions
based upon which participants would rate the candidate less favorably; mitigation of this
negative effect in either the shame or guilt conditions would be evidence for
appeasement.
It must be noted that “appeasement” is a broad term encompassing multiple
outcomes, achieved through many potential underlying mechanisms that have not been
fully explored in previous research on this subject. One of the prominent researchers in
this area defines appeasement as “the process by which individuals placate or pacify
others in situations of potential or actual conflict” (Keltner et al., 1997, p. 360). More
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broadly, appeasement occurs when an individual anticipates a negative reaction by
others, the individual emits some behavior, and the negative reaction is lessened or
eliminated. When analyzing the current study in these terms, the mistake manipulation
was introduced to garner the negative outcome (i.e., lower evaluation on Candidate
Evaluation Form). In the appeasement literature, the potential negative outcomes have
encompassed aggression, punishment, negative evaluations, social exclusion, and
interpersonal conflict. Certainly, the items on the Candidate Evaluation Form allow for
expression of any of these outcomes (e.g., aggression could be expressed through
unfavorable evaluations, punishment through not recommending hiring). Because of the
mistakes that are made, the candidate emits specific behaviors (i.e., shame and/or guilt).
As communication of shame and guilt are the only independent variables, any observed
lessening of participants’ negative reactions to the candidate’s mistakes can be attributed
to shame and/or guilt.
Notably, there may be multiple mechanisms by which this mitigation occurs.
Indeed, multiple mechanisms by which appeasement occurs have been suggested in the
literature. The mechanism that links the emitted behavior to the outcome could be
submission (deference), sympathy/empathy, forgiveness, or implicitly communicated
information about the transgressor. The information communicated in this latter category
could include the transgressor’s own condemnation of their transgression, the fact that
the transgression is less likely to be repeated, and that this action may not be
representative of this person’s true character. With few exceptions (e.g., Keltner et al.,
1997), the empirical studies of appeasement have not investigated the underlying
mechanisms leading to mitigation. The current study is no different; the goal of the
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present study was not to delineate the exact mechanism by which shame achieves
appeasement, in part, because shame is believed to operate through all of these
mechanisms.

Interpretation of Findings

Before specific hypotheses will be addressed, it is important to point out that the
paradigm used for this study did in fact lead to negative evaluations of the candidate.
Had this not been the case, there would be no negative effect for shame and/or guilt to
mitigate. Indeed, the manipulation showed a significant effect, as the no-shame/no-guilt
group, in which mistakes were made by the candidate, was evaluated much lower than
the control condition, in which no mistakes were made (i.e., a mean difference of 5.9),
with a large effect size of 1.59 (Cohen, 1988). Participants also received the opportunity
to provide open-ended comments while completing the Candidate Evaluation Form.
These comments have not yet been exhaustively content analyzed or assessed for the
reliability of coding. Yet, informal inspection of the comments revealed a consistent and
qualitatively different thrust to them as a function of the condition to which participants
had been randomly assigned. Several participants’ comments are quoted in this
Discussion as anecdotal evidence of the effects that participants’ experiences in each
condition had on them. Quotes are included only when a participant’s open-ended
comment seemed representative of those offered by his or his experimental condition
“cohorts.” The difference between the control and no-shame/no-guilt conditions is
evident in the following two quotes. A participant in the control condition exclaimed
that, “The candidate seemed to be quite a friendly person, and she seemed sincerely
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interested in the study,” while in contrast, a participant in the no-shame/no-guilt group
commented that, “I did not know if I would trust her for a job.”
It was hypothesized that there would be a main effect for shame (Hypothesis 1)
for participants’ evaluations of the candidate, such that they would evaluate the candidate
more favorably when shame was expressed than when it was not expressed. Hypothesis 1
was based on the rationale that unique nonverbal displays of shame communicate several
messages to participants, namely that the research candidate was aware of her multiple
mistakes during the interview, felt bad about them, and that she was sincerely sorry and
regretful for any impact those mistakes may have had on the participants’ scores. If
shame communicated these messages, it should appease participants, leading them to
offer less unfavorable, or more favorable, reactions to the candidate.
Results of the present investigation revealed a main effect for the shame
manipulation, and the form of this main effect strongly supported Hypothesis 1.
Participants rated the research candidate significantly more positively on the eight items
comprising the Candidate Evaluation Form when she expressed shame than when she did
not. One participant in the high-shame/no-guilt condition eloquently described the
positive effects of the nonverbal shame display, writing, “She messed up a few times but
was calm, regrouped, and carried on. I think it is mostly nerves. She spoke clearly and
slowly the rest of the time. People make mistakes, but I wouldn’t hold that against her.”
From this statement, it is clear that the participant was not angry or upset with the
candidate or her poor performance, but rather was forgiving and willing to excuse her
mistakes. This participant observation can be contrasted with another participant’s
statement who had taken part in the no-shame/high-guilt condition. In this participant’s
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words “She should be more convincing when saying she made a mistake.” Although the
candidate did indeed apologize multiple times for her mistakes, it is clear that these
attempts at reparation were far less believable without the nonverbal display of shame.
As stated in Hypothesis 2, it was predicted that there would be a Shame X Guilt
interaction. The first component of this interaction (Hypothesis 2a) was that
communication of guilt would not make an independent, positive contribution above that
contributed by the shame display. The second component was that guilt would
significantly contribute to positive candidate ratings above a response consisting of
neither shame nor guilt (Hypothesis 2b). In the present study, this hypothesis was not
supported, because although guilt did not uniquely contribute to favorable candidate
ratings above the shame response, it also did not significantly add to positive ratings
compared to the no-shame/no-guilt response.
According to Hypothesis 2a, verbalizing guilt--long with unique nonverbal
displays of shame--would not contribute to positive ratings of the candidate. In support of
Hypothesis 2a, the candidate was not rated significantly more favorably when the
candidate nonverbally expressed shame and also verbalized guilt compared to the
condition in which the candidate nonverbally expressed shame without an accompanying
guilt verbalization. As documented earlier, the study possessed ample power for this
effect to have been declared statistically significant. Not only was this main effect for
guilt not statistically significant, but the standardized mean difference of this contrast’s
effect size was only .01, which is a small effect size according to Cohen (1988). Orally
apologizing simply did not explain any additional variance above and beyond a
nonverbal expression of shame. Unlike the appeasement difference produced by shame’s
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presence or absence, the lack of an effect for verbalizations of guilt suggests that guilt’s
presence does not strike its recipients as serving a sufficiently salient appeasement
function. Again, the similarity of sample quotes from participants in these two
conditions can be used to exemplify this result. One participant in the high-shame/highguilt condition noted that “I think this candidate is sincere and intelligent, even though
she messed up a few times.” Similarly, a participant in the high-shame/no-guilt condition
commented that, “Few mistakes were made but she was quick to correct them. Very
friendly and tried to work her best without the microphone.”
In Hypothesis 3, it was stated that participants would rate the candidate more
favorably in the high-shame/no-guilt condition compared to the no-shame/high-guilt
condition. This hypothesis also received support, as the candidate was again rated more
favorably in the “pure shame” condition, compared to the “pure guilt” condition.
Interestingly, when comparing pure shame to the no-shame/no-guilt condition, the
standardized mean difference effect size was 1.14, which according to Cohen (1988) is a
large effect size. Importantly, this effect size is actually more than twice the value of the
effect size when comparing pure guilt and no-shame/no-guilt. Thus, the shame display
was much more effective in mitigating negative evaluations than a verbalization of guilt.
Finally, Hypothesis 4 stated ratings of the candidate who expressed shame would
be comparable to candidate ratings in the control condition in which the candidate had
flawlessly delivered all of the task instructions. Importantly, this hypothesis involves a
shift in baseline; rather than comparing to other conditions where mistakes were made,
these comparisons are to the no-mistake condition. Thus, what is being explored is not
how much more favorably the candidate would be rated over other mistake-present
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conditions, but rather the degree to which shame would mitigate unfavorable ratings in
contrast to the no-mistake baseline. In support of this hypothesis, there were no
significant differences between candidate ratings in the control condition compared with
either condition in which the candidate nonverbally expressed shame. Thus, although the
candidate made three blatant mistakes throughout the experimental session, expressing
shame nonverbally seemed to have alleviated negative impressions of the candidate, and
to have repaired any damage done to the, albeit brief, relationship between the candidate
and the participant.
These results bolster previous findings, deriving either from evolutionary and
similar sociological analyses of shame’s hypothesized functions. Authors who have
conceptualized shame through the lens of evolution argue for shame’s benefits by
stressing its role in social self-preservation, limiting damage to one’s reputation or status
in the group, or its functions as an appeasement mechanism. Although these authors
employ distinct terminology to characterize shame’s benefits, they all seem to stress that
shame’s expression increases fitness by helping individuals maintain or strengthen social
relationships, by motivating individuals to act in accordance with valued group norms, by
encouraging individuals to adopt and act on those norms as valued social traits or
personality characteristics, and thereby encouraging people to evaluate their very social
selves in terms of whether behavior is or is not consistent with internalized conceptions
of a positive social self. Keltner and colleagues (1997) cogently stated that shame
functions in situations of perceived or actual conflict that are social in nature and “leads
to social reconciliation by signaling the individual’s commitment to the social norms and
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by evoking emotions that increase cooperation (e.g., sympathy, forgiveness) and reduce
aggression (p. 363).
This evolutionary view of shame’s functions also rings true of the views of shame
espoused by various sociologists (Savitsky & Sim, 1974; Scheff, 1988; Tsoudis & SmithLovin, 1998). These individuals similarly stress that shame serves various appeasementrelated functions, such as communicating that their transgression is not typical of their
normal behavior and/or should not be expected to reoccur in the future. Thus, the
individual is communicating, albeit implicitly, to not be rejected or denigrated by the
group. An interesting quote from the sociologist Scheff exemplifies the similarities
between those viewing shame from an evolutionary lens and those from a more
sociologically oriented stance. Scheff exclaims that “shame is the (italics in original)
social emotion, arising as it does out of the monitoring of one’s own actions by viewing
one’s self from the standpoint of others” (p. 398). The main difference between
evolutionarily based views and those of the sociologists is that the former trace shame’s
functions much farther back in our ancestral heritage to shame becoming adaptive around
the same time that life-and-death matters revolving around cooperation and competition
in or between small social groups arose.
The findings of the current study supported these assertions regarding the
functions of shame. In the present study, participants who were “interacting” with a
research candidate were given the opportunity to rate the candidate on various
personality and work-related attributes, which were inherently social in nature. Although
the candidate made multiple mistakes that could have a negative impact on the
participants, those participants who viewed the candidate showing a shame response after
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committing those mistakes rated the candidate significantly more favorably. Thus, in
terms of an evolutionary view of shame, unfavorable impressions of the candidate were
mitigated when the candidate showed a shame response, thus eliciting forgiveness,
reducing aggression (i.e., in the form of more favorable candidate evaluation ratings),
and thus maintaining a positive social self.
Furthermore, when mistakes were made but only verbalizations of guilt were
communicated, candidate ratings were significantly less positive. This finding rendered
support for the assumption that it is not just verbally communicating regret that is
important, but rather it is the evolved submissive display that is essential to limit damage
done to the social relationship. Finally, participants did not rate the candidate
significantly differently on either the personality or work-related attributes when the
candidate made mistakes and showed shame, compared to making no mistakes at all.
Out of all of the supported hypotheses in this study, this evidence possibly provided the
strongest support for shame functioning as an appeasement mechanism. This is because
although the candidate made multiple mistakes, showing shame allowed the candidate to
maintain a positive image and be perceived as equally “likable,” “conscientious,”
“sincere,” “friendly,” someone whom participants would be “happy to work with,” and
someone who would be “a positive contribution to USU” (see also Appendix B),
compared with when the candidate made no mistakes at all.

Implications for Methodology Used to
Measure Shame and Guilt

The results of the current study are important, not only because they support an
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evolutionary view of shame as being adaptive, but because the methodology used
improves on past studies that investigated shame as an appeasement mechanism. As was
previously discussed, although multiple studies have been conducted on shame as an
appeasement mechanism, no studies to date have tested this assumption by
operationalizing shame through its reliably identifiable expression during what was
believed to be an actual live, interpersonal interaction. If shame serves its adaptive
functions in social interactions, it is essential to test this assumption in a social context
where actual damage is done to the social relationship, and a shame expression is used to
communicate regret or apology. This investigation improved on previous research by
doing just that; participants were interacting live with an individual who made multiple
mistakes that had a negative impact on participants’ scores on various tests, and a shame
expression was used to alleviate negative impressions of the candidate because of those
mistakes. To accurately capture shame’s adaptive functions in an ecologically valid
manner, it was essential to investigate shame in the context in which shame actually
functioned.
Not only does the current study have implications in terms of methodology used
to investigate the adaptive functions of shame, but these findings have a strong
implication for the use of self-report measures, in particular the TOSCA, for measuring
shame and guilt. To begin, as was mentioned previously, researchers using the TOSCA
have generally concluded that shame is maladaptive, while guilt is adaptive (see Tangney
& Dearing, 2002 for a review). However, it is essential for researchers to be cognizant of
the distinction between measures that assess trait emotions and those that assess state
emotions; a point that is important in terms of the results of the current study. The
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TOSCA was created with the intention of measuring shame and guilt proneness, thus
measuring these emotions as traits (Tangney, 1996). Conversely, many researchers who
assert that shame and guilt are adaptive are drawing those conclusions based on the
assumption that shame and guilt are adaptive when functioning as states, or as traits when
experienced at appropriate times/places/levels. The problem arises when researchers
using the TOSCA (which has been found to have serious construct validity problems)
generalize conclusions made regarding shame and guilt as traits to conclusions about
these emotions as states, as is commonly done (e.g., Dearing et al., 2005; Stoeber, Harris,
& Moon, 2006; Tangney & Dearing, 2002; Webb, Heisler, Call, Chickering, & Colburn,
2007). This overgeneralization is problematic because inappropriate conclusions
regarding shame and guilt drawn from the TOSCA are not only generalized to these
emotions as traits, but also as states. Thus, the contradiction in the literature regarding
shame’s adaptive versus maladaptive nature could be due to this overgeneralization of
questionable findings. The current study sheds light on the importance of this issue:
shame and guilt were operationalized as brief states, rather than prolonged traits as
operationalized in the TOSCA, and it was found that shame was, indeed, adaptive when
operationalized as such.
Being cognizant of the important distinction between state and trait emotions is
not only important because results could be inappropriately generalized, but this issue
also speaks to the importance of construct validity in psychological measures. As was
discussed at length in Chapter II, the TOSCA has been criticized by various researchers
because shame is operationalized a priori as maladaptive feelings, while guilt is
operationalized as adaptive behaviors (Elison, 2002, 2003a; Ferguson et al., 2007;
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Ferguson & Stegge, 1998; Luyten et al., 2002). From a methodological standpoint, in
order to accurately assess shame and guilt’s qualities, both emotions should be
operationalized similarly, in such a manner that positive and negative qualities of both
emotions are assessed. The TOSCA fails to measure the constructs of shame or guilt in
their entirety, thus it is no surprise that conclusions have been drawn that guilt is adaptive
and shame is maladaptive when they are operationalized as such. The results of the
current study have implications for this problem. When shame is operationalized through
an evolutionary lens (i.e., nonverbal behavior), rather than a priori as adaptive or
maladaptive, the conclusions drawn regarding these emotions are strikingly different. In
support of an evolutionary view of emotions, the data instead reveals shame as adaptive,
and actually the more adaptive emotional response to social transgressions. This finding
bolsters the multiple criticisms of the TOSCA regarding its biased operationalizations,
and maintains the view that widespread use of the TOSCA to measure shame and guilt
should be limited.
Finally, although the current study does not use the statistical technique
partialing, the results of the current study have implications for the use of partialing with
the TOSCA. Because these results indicate the TOSCA does not assess shame and guilt
in their entireties, this flaw in construct validity represents systematic error. Given that
the nature of the error is not consistent between the TOSCA shame scale and the TOSCA
guilt scale, partialing is likely to exacerbate these problems inherent in the TOSCA. In
effect, partialing magnifies systematic error (Elison et al., 2007, 2008). Biased
operationalizations of shame and guilt have contributed to the inaccurate conclusion that
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shame is maladaptive and guilt is adaptive. Most studies that employ the TOSCA also
employ partialing, thus, contributing to this skewed conclusion.
Results of this study combined with those of previous studies raise concerns
regarding whether the TOSCA validly measures shame or guilt. In previous
investigations using the TOSCA, guilt expressions have been found to be associated with
attributes that promote healthy interpersonal relationships (e.g., empathy). In contrast,
Tangney and her associates (2002) adamantly claim that shame expressions do little to
repair interpersonal damage. According to studies using the TOSCA, moreover,
consistent expressions of shame actually appear to undermine the welfare of
interpersonal relationships. These findings directly contradict the results of the current
study, which showed that guilt actually played no role in appeasing respondents who
were negatively impacted by the candidate’s performance. In fact, it was only shame’s
expressions that undid the interpersonal damage.
The strong contrast between these sets of results leads one to ask just what the
TOSCA actually is measuring. The TOSCA’s guilt items focus on immediate reparative
behaviors and apologies that lessen threats to the relationship, as discussed in Chapter II
(Elison, 2002, 2003a; Ferguson et al., 2007; Ferguson & Stegge, 1998; Luyten et al.,
2002). Strong endorsements of the TOSCA’s “guilt” items allow individuals to make a
good impression (e.g., that one is likely to quickly repair the damage), because these
endorsements imply a desire to mend the damage to the relationship. In contrast to the
TOSCA’s guilt items, Elison and colleagues (2007, 2008) have found that the TOSCA’s
shame items are not statistically associated with impression management tendencies. It is
clear from the TOSCA shame items that they focus on maladaptive, self-oriented
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responses (i.e., “You would feel incompetent”), which is less likely to make a good
impression on others. As Ferguson and Crowley (1994) emphasize, the TOSCA shame
responses are actually inappropriate to the provided scenario, whereas the guilt responses
are far more appropriate responses to these transgressions.
In addition to concerns regarding the TOSCA’s impression management biases,
Kugler and Jones (1992) have hypothesized that the TOSCA guilt scale measures
people’s awareness of appropriate interpersonal moral standards. Rather than assessing
an individuals’ likelihood of feeling guilty, the TOSCA guilt items instead measures
participants’ knowledge of moral standards and proper behavior (i.e., “You’d think you
should make it up to your friend as soon as possible”). Importantly, that awareness and
endorsement of morally appropriate conduct would, in turn, allow the individual to make
a good impression, as emphasized above. Because of this focus, it is not surprising that
the TOSCA guilt scale is positively associated with adaptive outcomes. In stark contrast,
the TOSCA’s shame items do not convey people’s awareness of interpersonal moral
standards. The focus instead is on selfish concerns and intrapunative responses that
neglect the welfare of the individual harmed by the behavior (i.e., “You would keep quiet
and avoid the coworker”). Because the shame items convey little concern for others’
welfare, individuals who strongly endorse them are unlikely to be engaged in impression
management strategies. It is, therefore, not surprising that the TOSCA shame measure is
positively associated with many negative outcomes (e.g., depression, emotional
instability, lack of sympathy/empathy). In all, it seems that the TOSCA is measuring
adaptive or appropriate guilt responses in two senses, the first reflecting people’s
knowledge of what makes a good impression on others, and the second involving their
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moral awareness. On the other hand, the TOSCA seems to assess “maladaptive shame”
because shame is operationalized as an undesirable response that further neglects the
importance of moral standards.

Limitations and Future Research Directions

Although the current study builds upon previous evidence supporting the
appeasement function of shame, the present study did have some limitations. One
possible limitation is that participants were not directly questioned about whether they
were aware of the manipulation of shame and/or guilt. Importantly, although a
manipulation check was not used, various sources of evidence exist supporting the
assumption that shame and/or guilt was, indeed, accurately displayed, and that
participants were aware of the communication of these emotions by the research
candidate.
To begin, shame and/or guilt was communicated after each mistake was made,
and also during a final closing statement made by the research candidate. Thus, these
emotions were communicated at four separate occasions throughout the 20-minute
testing session, for a total of approximately 10 seconds. Although a display of a total of
10 seconds may seem brief, Tomkins (1964) and Ekman (1992) asserted that natural,
nonverbal communication of emotions is, indeed, brief and short-lasting. Furthermore,
each display of shame consisted of the empirically supported action units for shame. As
was discussed in the literature review, a nonverbal display of shame consists of head and
gaze downward movements, which are the action units 54 and 64 of Ekman and Friesen’s
(1978) Facial Action Coding System (FACS). Each display of shame in both shame
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conditions consisted of these, and only these, action units. As was also emphasized in the
literature review, there is no distinct nonverbal display for guilt, thus, guilt was
communicated via verbalizations of apology and reparation, as is common in the emotion
literature (see Tangney & Dearing, 2002). Moreover, before shame and/or guilt was even
communicated, the research candidate made a statement such as, “Oh wait, hold on a
second,” in order to direct the participants’ attention to the screen. Thus, participants
were given ample time to change attention from their testing materials to the research
candidate’s emotional display.
Lastly, evidence of a more qualitative nature in the form of open-ended responses
provided by participants on the Candidate Evaluation Form supported the assertion that
shame and/or guilt was, indeed, manipulated in the current study. For example, various
statements were provided in both High Shame conditions indicating that participants
were aware of the candidate expressing shame. For example, “The candidate spoke
clearly and made good eye contact. The candidate made me feel comfortable,” or
“Everyone makes mistakes, but it’s what someone does to try and fix that mistake that
really counts.” These statements can be contrasted to comments from participants in the
no-shame/high-guilt condition, such as “The candidate misread instructions twice. I
don’t feel as if she was prepared, but she was sorry about it,” or “She seems unprepared
to give me the test and very bland in her first impression.” Lastly, just as participants
rated the candidate the least favorable in the no-shame/no-guilt condition, many
participant statements were similarly the most negative for this condition. For example,
one participant wrote “She did not seem cheerful or caring,” and another participant
commented “This candidate seemed very impersonal even for it being one-way
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communication through your TV set up. She just seemed like she was going through the
motions.” To conclude, although a manipulation check was not used, evidence does exist
to support the assertion that shame and/or guilt was, indeed, communicated and received
by the participants.
A related concern is the natural confound between operationalizing shame as an
emotional display and guilt as verbalizations. In other words, was it shame per se that
had the effect, or was it just any display of emotion that contributed to positive ratings of
the candidate. This is a natural confound, because as explained above and in the
literature review, there is no distinct nonverbal display for guilt. Thus, completely
reconciling this confound may not be possible. However, a direction for future research
would be to use various other negative emotional displays such as anger, disgust,
sadness, or fear to determine if it was the emotional expression or uniquely shame that
contributed to positive ratings.
It is clear from the data that the shame manipulation had a large effect on
participants’ ratings of the candidate, while guilt did not. This finding was inconsistent
with the interpretation that shame strengthens the impact of guilt by rendering guilt to be
perceived as more sincere. These results instead were clearly consistent with the
hypothesized appeasement functions of shame. What was not completely clear was
whether the more favorable candidate ratings truly represented “appeasement.”
Unfortunately, any such judgment depends on one’s definition of appeasement, of which
there are many. Various outcomes that have been used in the literature include reduced
aggression/punishment, lessened interpersonal conflict, more positive evaluations, and
avoidance of social exclusion. Indeed, the items on the Candidate Evaluation Form
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capture all of these outcomes. A potential limitation is that the various appeasementrelated outcomes were not evaluated distinctly from one another, but rather were
aggregated as a composite measure of the effect of shame and/or guilt on participants’
impressions. A related objection could be that participants may have rated the candidate
favorably over these eight items, but still have evaluated them as objectively less
competent. Following Semin and Manstead (1982), it was anticipated that in the current
study, shame’s appeasement function would manifest in multiple domains/outcomes.
Thus, items used in the dependent measure were intentionally designed to capture workand personality-related attributes. Perhaps, various outcomes have been used to
operationalize appeasement because it does, indeed, operate to reduce multiple classes of
negative outcomes. A direction for future research could be to investigate these multiple
outcomes separately, possibly by way of multiple dependent measures (e.g., state
measure of aggression, anger, sympathy, social exclusion via peer nominations).
A further concern that could be raised is the nature of the underlying mechanism
in which appeasement operates. The conclusion in the present study is that shame as
operationalized via its unique nonverbal display served to appease the participants.
However, if what was observed was appeasement, shame could have achieved this
through different underlying mechanisms. As was discussed above, the mechanism that
links the mistakes made by the candidate to the favorable ratings of the candidate could
be due to multiple shame-related mechanisms such as submission, sympathy/empathy, or
forgiveness. To elaborate, participants could have rated the research candidate more
favorably in both high-shame conditions because the candidate’s nonverbal display of
shame conveyed their emotional pain. Their perception of emotional pain, in turn, could
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have elicited sympathy (i.e., sorry for the candidate) or empathy (i.e., to help boost the
candidate’s self-perception) toward the candidate, thus achieving appeasement. Rather
than viewing these mechanisms as distinct from shame, they can be considered parallel
paths by which shame operates to lessen negative reactions from others. Disentangling
these mechanisms could be viewed as a limitation in the current study, but because
shame is believed to operate through multiple mechanisms, it is likely that multiple
mechanisms were responsible for the observed effect. A direction for further research
could be to contrast these mechanisms separately to determine the validity and impact of
each.
Distinct from the objections of the previous paragraph are alternate mechanisms
that represent truly rival hypotheses. In other words, neither shame nor the perception of
shame was responsible for the present findings. These alternative mechanisms could
include sympathy (unrelated to the perception of shame), self-deception, or impression
management. To elaborate, sympathy in response to general distress on the part of the
candidate could be hypothesized as the mechanism by which negative responses were
mitigated. For example, the participant could have just responded to what was perceived
as sadness, worry, or general negative affect on the part of the candidate, thus rating the
candidate more favorably. In this case, the more favorable ratings could represent true
appeasement or simply kindness, meaning they still believed the candidate to be
incompetent. As described above, careful measures in the operationalization of shame
(FACS coding) were taken to maximize the accurate conveyance of shame, thus not to be
confused with other negative emotional displays such as sadness. The facial display
studies described above in the Literature Review demonstrate that people reliably
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identify a static shame display at an explicit level (i.e., forced choice). Bolstering the
validity of this study, the shame display was dynamic, and for shame to achieve its
appeasement function, it does not require explicit identification.
Two rival hypotheses mentioned above are related: impression management and
self-deception. Due to the nature of the current study, both of these mechanisms are less
likely to operate here, in contrast to studies using hypothetical vignettes. For instance, in
terms of impression management, it could be supposed that participants rated the
candidate more favorably simply to make themselves appear more empathetic or
forgiving. However, participants had no reason to believe that anyone else knew the
candidate had, indeed, made mistakes, or that they would ever meet the candidate faceto-face. In terms of self-deception, participants could want to view themselves as a
forgiving, empathetic person, thus they unconsciously rated the participant more
favorably. Similarly, the participant could unconsciously want to avoid experiencing
shame because of not being sympathetic to the candidate’s response, thus again rating the
candidate favorably. Even if these latter two mechanisms were at play, one can argue
that shame was still achieving its appeasement function. For example, as was argued
above regarding true sympathy, if a shame display elicits a true emotional response in the
participant in the form of shame avoidance, which in turn results in favorable ratings of
the candidate, appeasement is still achieved.
A further limitation of the current study is that the appeasement function of shame
was only studied with a female research candidate. Support has been found for gender
differences in the display rules of emotions (Mosher & Tomkins, 1988), the effect an
emotional display may have on the receiver (Mosher & Tomkins), and gender differences
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in eliciting conditions (Ferguson & Eyre, 2000; Lewis, 1979). Thus, differences in the
favorable ratings of the candidate could possibly have been found if participants were
exposed to a male, rather than a female, research candidate. Although this argument
could be made, many studies providing evidence for the appeasement function of shame
have investigated shame with a male, rather than a female transgressor (Masters, 1988;
Robinson & Smith-Lovin, 1999; Semin & Manstead, 1982; Tsoudis & Smith-Lovin,
1998). Thus, in these studies it appears as though support for shame as an appeasement
mechanism generalizes across gender.
Furthermore, questions could be raised regarding how the findings of the present
study generalize across different situations. Although the current study only investigated
shame and guilt in the context of one specific achievement paradigm, it is likely that the
results will generalize beyond this situation. Shame functioning as an appeasement
mechanism has been explored and supported in a variety of different contexts ranging
from mild to more severe mistakes or transgressions (e.g., knocking over a store display,
mock jury trials, political campaigns). Thus, it seems as though the results of the current
study are not restricted, but rather broaden the findings of other researchers.
Furthermore, extending the point made by Semin and Manstead (1982), there are social
transgressions or qualities of oneself that evoke shame, but for which restitution may be
impossible (e.g., tripping or stupidity) and a communication of guilt inappropriate.
Therefore, a nonverbal shame or embarrassment display may be an individuals’ only
recourse to mitigate negative evaluations. Thus, a nonverbal shame display may function
in a broader range of contexts and situations than that explored in the current study, and
those in which guilt may be able to function.
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Finally, as is typical of most experimental studies, the influence of participant
characteristics, such as their religious affiliation, was not investigated. In the current
study, 90% of the participants self-identified as being a member of The Church of Jesus
Christ of Latter-day Saints. A relevant question is the extent to which this degree of
religious homogeneity impacted tests of the hypotheses. For example, the results’
generalizability might thus be reduced because of religious individuals’ tendencies to
engage in certain impression management tactics. If true, participants in this study may
have reacted very sympathetically because their religion dictates a forgiving attitude.
Based on this example, one might argue that obtaining results favorable to this study’s
hypotheses was biased by the sample’s religious composition. This potential limitation
needs to be viewed in light of the similarity of results obtained in this study and those
found in several other studies using diverse samples (Keltner et al., 1997; Lazowski,
1988; Savitsky & Sim, 1974; Tsoudis & Smith-Lovin, 1998). Nonetheless, because of
the obvious relevance of guilt and shame to many religions, it would be interesting to
explore whether the appeasement-related effects are stronger in highly religious groups
than in nonreligious ones.
The above-reviewed limitations can be used to stimulate further research. The
current study fits neatly with a series of empirical studies performed by multiple
researchers exploring multiple domains, antecedents, and outcomes. In light of the
mounting evidence for shame’s appeasement functions, three important directions for
future research are: (a) exploring the specific mechanisms by which appeasement
operates; (b) explore the temporal unfolding of the appeasement process; and (c)
investigating the correlations between the specific domains, mechanisms, and outcomes
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associated with appeasement. To elaborate, one could explicitly test the sympathy
mechanism (Keltner et al., 1997), by including a manipulation check of sympathy, in
contrast to other rival mechanisms. To explore the temporal unfolding, one could use
repeated measures designs testing, for example, temporal changes in outcomes and
process variables. More specifically, in the current study, sympathy levels and
evaluations could have been measured before a mistake, after a mistake, and after an
apology, with the expectation that ratings would be highest at time 1 and time 3. Lastly,
one could assess the relative likelihoods of specific outcomes being affected by specific
mechanisms in response to a given domain. For example, in relationships of unequal
power, a submissive display by a subordinate may placate a superior, while at the same
time, the superior delights in the subordinate’s pain (i.e., superior feels no sympathy for
the subordinate). Taken together, these three avenues of research present a virtual
goldmine of research possibilities.
In summary, the present investigation strongly supported the view that shame,
when operationalized through an evolutionary view as stated, is adaptive and essential to
positive human functioning in the social environment. Importantly, these findings
directly contradicted the wide-held assumption based on studies using the TOSCA that
“guilt is especially likely to ‘take a turn for the worse’ when it becomes fused with
shame” (Tangney & Dearing, 2002, p. 45). Rather, shame alone can serve a fundamental
appeasement function in social relationships by mitigating unfavorable responses after a
transgression. Because these findings fly in the face of the currently held view that
shame is the dark, less moral emotion, in contrast to guilt (“the moral emotion of
choice”), widespread use of the TOSCA should be limited. Neither emotion is uniformly

111
adaptive or maladaptive, but it appears that--in the moment--the nonverbal shame
response is crucial to sincerely convey regret or apology after a mistake or transgression.
Apparently, saying “sorry” is not quite enough.

Footnotes:
1

Data were originally collected from 125 students, but after debriefing each participant,

data from 15 students were excluded because these participants recognized the deception.

2

A Varimax rotation was also performed, but the Promax rotation produced simple

structure. The proportion of loadings in the hyperplane (i.e., between plus and minus
0.10) equaled zero for the Varimax rotation, and was 19% for the Promax rotation with
Kappa = 4.
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Table A1
Investigations of Shame and Its Correlates

Study

n

Population

Assessment
instrument

Murray et al., 2007

176

College

SSGS

W ebb et al., 2007

280

College

Baldwin et al., 2006

190

College

Grabhorn et al., 2006

120

Clinical with
eating disorder

Pineles et al., 2006

156

Stoeber et al., 2006
Dearing et al., 2005

Abe, 2004

Dependent
measure

Effect
size

SC
HRS
GA

-.02
.08
.300***

TOSCA

Depression
Isolation
Rejection
Neglect

.42***
.26***
.24***
.19***

TOSCA

GSE
SSE

-.29***
-.18**

ISS

Social anxiety

.96***

College

TOSCA

PS
PTSC
Somatization
SC

.23**
.32***
.30**
.38**

121

College

TOSCA

Perfectionism

.48***

235

College

TOSCA

249

College

TOSCA

332

Inmates

TOSCA-SD

Alcohol use
Drug use
Alcohol use
Drug use
Alcohol use
Drug use

.21**
.06
.06
.02
.12**
.21***

97

College

TOSCA

Emotional
instability
Emotional
instability

.24*

DES

.31***

Covert et al., 2003

233

College

TOSCA

IPS
Self-efficacy
OES
OEO

-.05
-.18**
-.27***
-.07

Leskela et al., 2002

107

POW s

TOSCA

PTSD

.28***
(table continues)
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Study
Luyten et al., 2002

n
870

Population
Adults

Assessment
instrument
TOSCA

Dependent
measure

Effect
size

Depression
Externalizing
Anxiety
Anger

.32***
.28***
.35***
.16***

Note. TOSCA = Test of Self Conscious Affect; TOSCA-SD = Test of Self Conscious Affect for
Socially Deviant groups; ISS = Internalized Shame Scale; SSGS = State Shame and Guilt Scale; DES =
Differential Emotion Scale; GSE = General Self-Efficacy; SSE = Social-Self Efficacy; SC = Spiritual
Connectedness; HRS = High-Risk Sex; GA = Good Alienation; PS = Psychological Symptoms; PTSD =
Post Traumatic Stress Disorder; SC = Self-Concealment; IPS = Interpersonal Problem Solving; OES =
Outcome Expectancy for Self; and OEO = Outcome Expectancy for Others. Effect size is expressed as
Pearson correlations.
*p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001.
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(For Office Use Only)
Candidate Name:
H. R. File Number:
Date of Interview:

Candidate Evaluation Form
Directions: Below is a list of statements regarding your evaluation of the research
candidate that administered the tests to you. Please use the scale below and rate how
much you agree or disagree with each statement. Read each statement carefully and
circle the number you feel most closely resembles your opinion of the candidate.

1
Strongly
Disagree

2
Disagree

3
Neutral

4
Agree

5
Strongly Agree

1 2 3 4 5

1. I believe this person is hardworking.

1 2 3 4 5

2. I found this person to be likable.

1 2 3 4 5

3. I would hire this person for the position.

1 2 3 4 5

4. I think this person is conscientious.

1 2 3 4 5

5. I feel this person is sincere.

1 2 3 4 5

6. I feel this person would be effective at performing their job.

1 2 3 4 5

7. I would be happy working with this person.

1 2 3 4 5

8. I found this person to be friendly.

1 2 3 4 5

9. I feel this person would be a positive contribution to U.S.U.

1 2 3 4 5

10. I think this person is responsible.

1 2 3 4 5

11. I feel this person is helpful.

1 2 3 4 5

12. I feel this person is intelligent.

Additional Comments: _____________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
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Thesis Script
USU Researcher:
You have been asked to participate in a study being conducted by the USU psychology
department. In this study, we are assessing the relationship between personality and
certain aspects of intelligence. You will be asked to complete one personality test and 3
intelligence tests. A unique aspect of this study is that it is being conducted online via a
webcam. It is necessary for us to conduct this study online because the actual people
administering the study are not located in Utah, but at various universities across the U.S.
The individuals administering the tests are actually applying for a coveted researcher
position here at USU, and they are administering the tests as part of the
“practical/applied” aspect of the interview. Not only will you be participating in the
study by completing the personality and intelligence tests, but you will also be evaluating
the effectiveness of the research candidates. The candidates have already completed the
self-report paper and pencil portion of the interview, and the person administering the
tests to you is one of the 20 candidates that have made it to this final portion of their
interview. Because we are not equipped with a web camera at the psychology
department here at USU, you will be able to see and hear the research candidate, but they
will not be able to see or hear you. Because they cannot see or hear you, it is very
important that you pay close attention to the instructions given by the research candidate
for each test. Once you have completed the tests, you will be given a short questionnaire
to give your opinion about the research candidate. The position these candidates is
applying for is very desirable, and the professors here really care about your judgments,
so please take your ratings of the candidate seriously. The entire testing session should
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only last about 25-30 minutes. Just sit tight after the testing is completed, and I will
come in and gather your testing materials. Do you have any questions?
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Research Candidate: Hi, my name is **INSERT NAME**, and as part of my interview,
I will be administering the 4 tests to you. The testing period should only last about 25
minutes, and when we are done, the researcher at U.S.U. will come in and give you any
further instruction. Record all of your answers on the answer sheets provided. Let’s get
started.
Test 1- Digit Span
Research Candidate: (Read the instructions to the digit span test, but forget to tell the
participant to write the numbers backwards). After reading and having the participants
write 3 strings of numbers, the research candidate will say:
o High Shame/High Guilt: (With brief gaze aversion and head down) “I messed
up. I didn’t read all of the instructions. After I read you the numbers, you are
supposed to write the string of numbers down backwards. I’m sorry, but we will
have to start over.”
o High Shame/No Guilt: (With brief gaze aversion and head down) “I messed up.
I didn’t read all of the instructions. After I read you the numbers, you are
supposed to write the string of numbers down backwards. We will have to start
over.”
o No Shame/High Guilt: (With NO gaze aversion or head down) “That’s wrong. I
didn’t read all of the instructions. After I read you the numbers, you are supposed
to write the string of numbers down backwards. I’m sorry, but we will have to
start over.”
o No Shame/No Guilt: (With NO gaze aversion or head down) “That’s wrong. I
didn’t read all of the instructions. After I read you the numbers, you are supposed
to write the string of numbers down backwards. We will have to start over.”
*** Start over again, and have the participants complete 6 strings of numbers***
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Test 2- Word Recall
Research Candidate: (Read the instructions for the word recall.) After reading through
all of the instructions and the participant begins to write down words they have
remembered, the research candidate will realize that he has read the wrong list of words
and say:
o High Shame/High Guilt: (With brief gaze aversion and head down) “I really
apologize, but I read the wrong list of words.”
o High Shame/No Guilt: (With brief gaze aversion and head down) “I read the
wrong list of words.”
o No Shame/High Guilt: (With NO gaze aversion or head down) “I really
apologize, but I read the wrong list of words.
o No Shame/No Guilt: (With NO gaze aversion or head down) “I read the wrong
list of words.”

Test 3- Color Code Personality Test **NO RESEARCHER MISTAKE**
Test 4- Verbal IQ Test
Research Candidate: (Researcher reads the instructions, and then the multiple choice
items for the test, while the participant marks down their response on a response sheet.
On the 3rd item, the researcher will make a mistake.) Researcher will read the 3rd item
question, with the 3 of the 4th item responses. They will then realize that they read the
wrong responses, and say:
o High Shame/High Guilt: (With brief gaze aversion and head down) “I’m sorry, I
should have practiced administering this test more before the interview. Let me
start over.”
o High Shame/No Guilt: (With brief gaze aversion and head down) “Let me start
over.”
o No Shame/High Guilt: (With NO gaze aversion or head down) “I’m sorry, I
should have practiced administering this test more before the interview. Let me
start over.”
o No Shame/No Guilt: (With NO gaze aversion or head down) “Let me start over.”
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Testing Completed
o High Shame/High Guilt: “That is all of the tests that you will be asked to
complete. The USU researcher will be in in just a moment to give you further
instruction. (With brief gaze aversion and head down) I just wanted to say that I
am sorry for the mistakes I made when administering your tests. I hope my goofups didn’t give you a bad impression of me and didn’t negatively impact your
score. Thank you for your participation.”
o High Shame/No Guilt: “That is all of the tests that you will be asked to
complete. The USU researcher will be in in just a moment to give you further
instruction. (With brief gaze aversion and head down) I hope the goof-ups didn’t
give you a bad impression of me. Thank you for your participation.”
o No Shame/High Guilt: “That is all of the tests that you will be asked to
complete. The USU researcher will be in in just a moment to give you further
instruction. (With NO gaze aversion or head down) I just wanted to say that I am
sorry for the mistakes I made when administering your tests. I hope they didn’t
negatively impact your score. Thank you for your participation.”
o No Shame/No Guilt: “That is all of the tests that you will be asked to complete.
The USU researcher will be in in just a moment to give you further instruction.
(With NO gaze aversion or head down) Thank you for your participation.”
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USU Researcher: (Comes in to gather the test supplies. They wait five minutes to
“score” the tests, and then re-enters the room of the participant) The USU researcher
says, “I scored your tests, and you scored in the average range on the intelligence tests. I
can’t tell you anything about how that related to personality until we complete all of the
testing. We now need you to fill out this evaluation form of the research candidate’s
performance. Again, the University believes your opinions are very important, so please
take your ratings seriously. (The researcher leaves for another 5 minutes and returns).
The last thing I need you to do is answer these last 4 questions. For these questions,
please answer each question as if you were answering how you feel the research
candidate would answer each question. Take your time, and I will be right outside the
office when you are done.”
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Digit Span Test
“The first test is called a digit span test.”
Instructions: I am going to read you several lists of numbers. After each list I read to
you, write down that same list of numbers on your answer sheet. Please write each list of
numbers down on the lines provided on the answer sheet. I’ll pause about 10 seconds to
let you answer each question before moving on. OK, let’s begin.
List 1.
1

5

2

6

9

4

1

0

List 2

List 3
5

Oh wait, hold on a second… (wait 2 seconds) [INSERT 2x2 here]
List 1.
1

5

2

6

9

4

1

0

5

3

8

7

1

2

5

1

0

7

6

2

7

8

4

1

0

2

List 2

List 3

List 4

List 5

List 6
7
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Digit Span Test **CONTROL GROUP- NO MISTAKE**
“The first test is called a digit span test.”
Instructions: I am going to read you several lists of numbers. After each list I read to
you, write down that same list of numbers BACKWARDS on your answer sheet. Please
write each list of numbers down on the lines provided on the answer sheet. I’ll pause
about 10 seconds to let you answer each question before moving on. OK, let’s begin.
List 1.
1

5

2

6

9

4

1

0

5

3

8

7

1

2

5

1

0

7

6

2

7

8

4

1

0

2

List 2

List 3

List 4

List 5

List 6
7
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Word Recall Test
“This second test is called a word recall test.”
Instructions: I am going to read you a list of 20 words. After I have read the entire list of
words, you will have 2 minutes to write down as many words as you can remember.
Please do not write anything until I’ve finished the list and said “OK begin.” Please
write each word down on the answer sheet provided. Here we go…

List 1:
1. House
2. Car
3. Umbrella
4. Jacket
5. Tower
6. Hungry
7. Computer
8. Sandals
9. Remote
10. Couch
11. Candle
12. Happy
13. Winter
14. School
15. Drive
16. Rigging
17. Ear
18. Quarter
19. Shoe
20. Person
OK Begin.
(Wait 5 seconds)
Oh, stop writing.
(Wait 2 seconds)
[INSERT 2x2 here]
(The researcher then reads the new list of words more quickly, acting very nervous
because of the mistake)
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Let’s start over. I’m going to read you the right list. Here we go again.
1. Volume
2. Throne
3. Octopus
4. Short
5. Movie
6. Restaurant
7. Apartment
8. Journal
9. Sleep
10. Diet
11. Drama
12. Key
13. Pear
14. Truth
15. Bandage
16. Serpent
17. Whistle
18. Sea
19. Staple
20. Pavement
OK Begin.
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Word Recall Test**CONTROL GROUP- NO MISTAKE**
“This second test is called a word recall test.”
Instructions: I am going to read you a list of 20 words. After I have read the entire
list of words, you will have 2 minutes to write down as many words as you can
remember. Please do not write anything until I’ve finished the list and said “OK
begin.” Please write each word down on the answer sheet provided. Here we go…
21. Volume
22. Throne
23. Octopus
24. Short
25. Movie
26. Restaurant
27. Apartment
28. Journal
29. Sleep
30. Diet
31. Drama
32. Key
33. Pear
34. Truth
35. Bandage
36. Serpent
37. Whistle
38. Sea
39. Staple
40. Pavement
OK Begin.
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Personality Test
“This third test is just a multiple choice test consisting of ten questions.”
Instructions: For each question I read to you, please circle the letter that corresponds
to the answer that best represents you on your answer sheet. You will have about 10
seconds to answer each question.
1.

For me, life is most meaningful when it:
a. Is task oriented and productive
b. Is filled with people and purpose
c. Is free of pressure and stress
d. Allows me to be playful, light-hearted, and optimistic
The question was: For me, life is most meaningful when it:

2.

When involved in an intimate relationship, if I feel threatened by my partner,
I:
a. Fight back with facts and anger
b. Cry, feel hurt, and plan revenge
c. Become quiet, withdrawn, and often hold back anger until I blow up over
some minor issue later
d. Distance myself and avoid further conflict
The question was: When involved in an intimate relationship, if I feel
threatened by my partner, I:

3.

If I applied for a job, a prospective employer would most likely hire me
because I am:
a. Driven, direct, and delegating
b. Deliberate, accurate, and reliable
c. Patient, adaptable, and tactful
d. Funloving, spirited, and casual
The question was: If I applied for a job, a prospective employer would most
likely hire me because I am:

4.

If my friend was in trouble, I would be:
a. Protective, resourceful, and recommend solutions
b. Concerned, empathetic, and loyal- regardless of the problem
c. Supportive, patient, and a good listener
d. Nonjudgmental, optimistic, and downplaying the seriousness of the
situation
The question was: If my friend was in trouble, I would be:

144
5.

When I fail, I feel:
a. Silently self-critical, yet verbally stubborn and defensive
b. Guilt, self-critical, and vulnerable to depression- I dwell on it
c. Unsettled and fearful, but I keep it to myself
d. Embarrassed and nervous- seeking to escape the situation
The question was: When I fail, I feel:

6.

Work is:
a. A most productive way to spend one’s time
b. A healthy activity, which should be done right if it’s to be done at all.
Work should be done before one plays
c. A positive activity as long as it is something I enjoy and don’t feel
pressured to accomplish
d. A necessary evil, much less inviting than play
The question was: Work is:

7.

In social situations, I am most often:
a. Feared by others
b. Admired by others
c. Protected by others
d. Envied by others
The question was: In social situations, I am most often

8.

To feel alive and positive, I seek:
a. Adventure, leadership, and lots of action
b. Security, creativity, and purpose
c. Acceptance and safety
d. Excitement, playful productivity, and the company of others
The question was: To feel alive and positive, I seek:

9.

In a relationship, I am most concerned with being:
a. Approved of and right
b. Understood, appreciated, and intimate
c. Respected, tolerant, and peaceful
d. Praised, having fun, and feeling free
The question was: In a relationship, I am most concerned with being:
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10.

If someone crosses me:
a. I am angered, and cunningly plan ways to get even quickly
b. I am deeply hurt and find it almost impossible to forgive completely.
Generally, getting even is not enough
c. I am silently hurt and plan to get even and/or completely avoid the other
person
d. I want to avoid confrontation, consider the situation not important enough
to bother with and/or seek other friends
The question was: If someone crosses me:
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Verbal IQ Test
This last test is also a multiple choice test consisting of 8 items.
Instructions: For each question I read to you, please circle the letter that best answers
each question on your answer sheet. You will have about 15 seconds to answer each
question.

For the first three questions, please indicate the word that best completes the sentence:
1. While some of the information in the book will be shocking to readers, most of what
the author writes is really quite ____________.
A. Immoral
B. Dubious
C. Severe
D. Commonplace
Again, the question is While some of the information in the book will be shocking to
readers, most of what the author writes is really quite ____________.

2. Although a few of the plot twists in her novel were unexpected, overall, the major
events depicted in the work were ___________ enough.
A. Lively
B. Well developed
C. Predictable
D. Complex
Again, the question is Although a few of the plot twists in her novel were unexpected,
overall, the major events depicted in the work were ___________ enough.

3. A recent poll shows that, while 81 percent of college students are eligible for some
form of financial aid, only 63 percent of these students are ____________ such aid.
A. closet is to clothes
B. court is to justice

“Oh wait, those are the wrong choices.”
[INSERT 2x2]
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Let me start over. Question 3.
3. A recent poll shows that, while 81 percent of college students are eligible for some
form of financial aid, only 63 percent of these students are ____________ such aid.
A.
B.
C.
D.

Complaining about
Recipients of
Dissatisfied with
Paying for

Again, the question is A recent poll shows that, while 81 percent of college students are
eligible for some form of financial aid, only 63 percent of these students are
____________ such aid.
The next two questions are analogies. Feel free to write down the analogy words to
answer the question.
4. Hospital is to healing as
A. closet is to clothes
B. court is to justice
C. mill is to machinery
D. symphony is to instruments
Again, Hospital is to healing as

5. Dog is to mammal as
A. larva is to insect
B. penguin is to bird
C. sonnet is to stanza
D. computer is to machine
Again, Dog is to mammal as

The next 3 questions are about writing terms.
6. Which of the following is a simile?
A. The clouds were like cotton candy.
B. He is as big as a house.
C. Bang!
D. Jumbo shrimp
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Again, the question is Which of the following is a simile?

7. Which is an example of alliteration?
A. Language Arts
B. Peter Piper Picked Peppers
C. I like music
D. A beautiful scenery with music.
Again, the question is Which is an example of alliteration?

8. What is the word for a “play on words”?
A.
B.
C.
D.

pun
hyperbole
haiku
metaphor

Again, the question is What is the word for a “play on words”?
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Verbal IQ Test**CONTROL GROUP- NO MISTAKE**
“This last test is also a multiple choice test consisting of 8 items.”
Instructions: For each question I read to you, please circle the letter that best answers
each question on your answer sheet. You will have about 15 seconds to answer each
question.

For the first three questions, please indicate the word that best completes the sentence:
1. While some of the information in the book will be shocking to readers, most of what
the author writes is really quite ____________.
A. Immoral
B. Dubious
C. Severe
D. Commonplace
Again, the question is While some of the information in the book will be shocking to
readers, most of what the author writes is really quite ____________.

2. Although a few of the plot twists in her novel were unexpected, overall, the major
events depicted in the work were ___________ enough.
A. Lively
B. Well developed
C. Predictable
D. Complex
Again, the question is Although a few of the plot twists in her novel were unexpected,
overall, the major events depicted in the work were ___________ enough.

3. A recent poll shows that, while 81 percent of college students are eligible for some
form of financial aid, only 63 percent of these students are ____________ such aid.
A.
E.
F.
G.

Complaining about
Recipients of
Dissatisfied with
Paying for
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Again, the question is A recent poll shows that, while 81 percent of college students are
eligible for some form of financial aid, only 63 percent of these students are
____________ such aid.
The next two questions are analogies. Feel free to write down the analogy words to
answer the question.
4. Hospital is to healing as
A. closet is to clothes
B. court is to justice
C. mill is to machinery
D. symphony is to instruments
Again, Hospital is to healing as

5. Dog is to mammal as
A. larva is to insect
B. penguin is to bird
C. sonnet is to stanza
D. computer is to machine
Again, Dog is to mammal as

The next 3 questions are about writing terms.
6. Which of the following is a simile?
A. The clouds were like cotton candy.
B. He is as big as a house.
C. Bang!
D. Jumbo shrimp
Again, the question is Which of the following is a simile?

7. Which is an example of alliteration?
A. Language Arts
B. Peter Piper Picked Peppers
C. I like music
D. A beautiful scenery with music.
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Again, the question is Which is an example of alliteration?

8. What is the word for a “play on words”?
H.
I.
J.
K.

pun
hyperbole
haiku
metaphor

Again, the question is What is the word for a “play on words”?
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Appendix E:
Debriefing Questions
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Debriefing
1) Do you have any questions/comments about your participation?

2) Do you feel your opinions of this candidate will be taken seriously?

3) I know we had the problem with the microphone not working, but other than that, did
you feel the rest of the equipment worked properly?

4) Did the interviewee seem sincere in her role as a graduate student applicant?

5) Did you ever suspect that there was another objective of this study besides studying
the relationship between personality and intelligence? If so, what?

6) Did you ever suspect she wasn’t really an applicant for a job?

7) Did you ever suspect that the mistakes she was making were not real?

8) What do you think we were really investigating in this study?

9) Did anyone tell you the purpose of the study?
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Appendix F:
Informed Consent Forms
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Date Created: Sept. 6, 2007USU IRB
Approved 09/06/2007
Approval term inates 09/05//2008
Protocol N um ber 1821
IRB Password Protected per

Department of Psychology
2810 Old Main Hill
Logan, UT 84322-2810
(435) 797-3272

IR

Letter of Information
Personality and Intelligence
Introduction/Purpose: Dr. Tamara Ferguson in the Department of Psychology at USU
and Elizabeth Dansie, a student researcher are inviting you to participate in a research
study that will explore the relationship between certain forms of intelligence and
personality. This study is being done at USU with a total of approximately 150
participants, age 18 years and older. There are two purposes to this study. The first
purpose is to investigate how certain forms of intelligence are related to personality
characteristics. The second purpose is to ask you to assist us in evaluating a research
candidate for a position here at USU.
Procedures: You will be asked to complete three short tests of intelligence, one
personality measure, and one brief evaluation form of the candidate. Then, as a final
evaluation of the candidate, you will be asked to answer four short questions as if you
were the candidate. The entire session may take 25-30 minutes. The candidate will be
the individual actually administering the intelligence and personality tests to you.
Because the candidates are located across the country, they will administer the tests to
you over a web cam, so you will be watching and listening to the candidate from a
computer monitor with a headset. Although you are routinely exposed to these types of
measures as a college student, it is possible that the testing session could make you
uncomfortable.
Please do not put your name anywhere on the instruments so that your tests remain
anonymous. You may skip any question you do not want to answer; however, by
answering each question, this will help strengthen the outcome of the study. A debriefing
will follow, where you will have the opportunity to ask any further questions you may
have about the study.
Risks/Benefits: Your participation in this study is considered minimal risk. However,
there is a possibility that you may become uncomfortable or upset. If you experience
emotional discomfort, please inform the researchers at any time. If you need further
assistance, you can also contact the USU Counseling Center. They are located in the
Taggart Student Center Room 306, (435)797-1012.

B Adm inistrat
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There may not be a direct benefit to you at this time. Pending approval of the professor
of your course, you may receive extra credit points for your participation in this study.
You will be informed verbally if extra credit will be offered. The researchers hope to
learn about how intelligence and personality are related. More importantly, they wish to
gain a student’s perspective on the various research candidates that are interviewing for
this very important position in the Psychology department.
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D ate Created: Sept. 6, 2007
U SU IRB Approved 09/06/2007
Approval term inates 09/05//2008
Protocol N um ber 1821
IRB Password Protected per

IR

Department of Psychology
2810 Old Main Hill
Logan, UT 84322-2810
(435) 797-3272

Letter of Information
Personality and Intelligence
Explanation and Offer to Answer Questions: You may ask questions throughout this
study at any time. Please contact the researchers by phone or email (contact information
is below).
Voluntary Participation and Withdrawal from Study: Participation is voluntary.
You may discontinue the study at any time for any reason without consequence.
Confidentiality: Research records will be kept confidential, consistent with federal and
state regulations. Only the researchers will have access to the surveys. All data will be
kept in a locked file cabinet in a locked room of Dr. Ferguson. Age and sex of the
participant will be the only identifying information obtained and retained. You will also
have the option to not provide that information.
IRB Approval Statement: The Institutional Review Board for the protection of
participants in research has approved this study. If you have any questions about your
rights please contact them at (435) 797-1821.
Researcher’s Statement:
The research has been explained to the participant by Elizabeth Dansie and s/he
understands the study, possible risks and benefits, and that taking part in the study is
completely voluntary. The participant has had a chance to ask questions and have them
answered.

_____________________________
Dr. Tamara Ferguson
Principal Investigator
(435) 797-3272
tjferguson@cc.usu.edu

________________________________
Elizabeth J. Dansie
Student Researcher
(435) 797-1460
FAX (435) 797-1448
lilboo999@hotmail.com
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